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Introduction
In this paper I analyse regionalisation in the Russian Federation as institutional change.
Regionalisation I define as the capacity and preference of subjects of the Federation to ignore
constitutional prerogatives. Regionalisation is thus an inconstancy and inconsistency in the
distribution of competencies. The great interregional differences between prices and cost of
living1, financial flows between centre and region2, the contrasting "interpretations" of the
federal privatisation programmes3, contradictions between federal constitutions and regional
charters4 comprise just a few instances of regionalisation. The question is: why has such
regionalisation become a feature of politics in the new Russian state? My accounts analyse
regionalisation both on the level of the regions and from an institutional perspective, which
seems more satisfactory than simply deducing it from the weakness of the centre as a sort of
"smuta" phenomenon.5
Institutions are systems of rules stabile over time and drawing their strength from this
stability, acting as "anchors in the flux of time". Neo-Institutionalism in all its different forms
constitutes a specific understanding of social structure that focuses on the production and
reproduction of rules and norms over time, regarding their role in stabilising expectations
about the future as being central to the "problem of order" in society. The idea of the "virtuous
circle" is of special significance: once created, rules hold sway due to their very existence,
independent of their contents, as actors lock in to them. Necessarily, the question of how
institutions change arises. In this paper I am interested theoretically in exploring the
contrasting conceptualisations of institutional change by the two main currents in neo-
institutionalist theory: historical neo-institutionalism (institution-centred, hereafter HI) and
economic neo-institutionalism (actor-centred, hereafter EI).6 In HI the inquiry focuses on the
state-structure in a broad sense7, in EI the institution par excellence is the code of property-
rights as the most basic determinant of the incentives of actors.8 HI understands change as
"punctuated equillibrium", i.e. as periods of stability, punctuated by crisis bringing about the
new formation of institutions.9 EI, on the other hand, sees change occurring incrementally and
evolutionary as a result of changing preferences of rational actors.10
I explore the relative explanatory potential offered by these theoretical schools by
instrumentalising their paradigms in analysing the processes of regionalisation in the Russian
Federation in the period up to 1997. The paper is therefore divided into two parts: an analysis
in the language of historical institutionalism, followed by an analysis in the language of
                                                          
1 See Hanson 1995; idem 1993.
2 See Treisman 1995; Kirkow 1996.
3 See Kovalevskii 1995; Schwanitz 1997.
4 See 'Kommersant', no. 8, 4/3/97.
5 For discussions of levels of analysis see Spiegeleire 1995; Buzan 1995.
6 Economic (Neo)-Institutionalism is also referred to in the literature as Rational-Choice or Actor
   Orientated (Neo)Institutionalism, Historic (Neo)institutionalism as Institution-Centred (Neo)
   Institutionalism. For an exegese of the differences between these two schools see Steinmo/Thelen
   1992; Hall /Taylor 1996; Kato 1997.
7 The key-texts in historical institutionalism are Krasner 1984; idem 1988.
8 The key text in the school of economic Neo-Institutionalism is North 1990.
9 For this paradigm see Ickenberry 1988; Krasner 1989.
10 North 1990.
economic institutionalism. To clarify the argumentation and highlight the contrast between
these two explanations I utilise a dependent/independent-variable paradigm. The dependent
variables are respectively state-structure (HI) and the codification of property-rights (EI).
1 Regionalisation from an Historical-Institutionalist Perspective
1.1 Dependent Variable: The Production of Regionalisation
The HI account of institutional change considers institutions to govern human action:
An institutional perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building blocks of social and
political life. The preferences, capabilities and basic self-identities of individuals are conditioned by these
structures.11
Krasner envisages a sort of hierarchy of institutions, measured according to breadth (how
much action do they influence?) and depth (how profoundly do they do so?):
Institutions that have high degrees of breadth and depth, that define the nature of actors and have many
links with other institutions, are not up for grabs. They are taken for granted. Support does not have to be
continually mobilised to sustain them. They are not challenged, either because actors accept them, as if
given by nature (they do not even conceive of alternatives) or because particular behaviors and outcomes
seem so fixed that the costs of changing appear to be prohibited.12
The institution which Krasner holds for the widest and deepest is the sovereign state. The
structure of the state constitutes the dependent variable in this analysis of regionalisation as
intrinsic to the new Russian Federation. First, it is necessary to look at the components of the
institutional order which currently causes regionalisation before proceeding to examine the
genealogy of this order. These components comprise: the institutions of the region, the region
as institution, and the Federal Council (the institution of the regions).
1.1.1 The Institutions of the Regions: The Regional Presidentialism
A) The institutions of the region help make atoms out of the regions.13 Juan Linz has shown
that rigid terms of office and 'winner-takes-all' elections discourage political organisation.14
With the regional 'presidentialism'15 is this all the more the case. Party formation or other
political organisation does not occur, because it is more or less irrelevant for the acquisition
and exercise of power. This combines with the effects of the 'hyperpresidentialism' at the
centre. Instead, connections to sponsors are vital. The number of those in a given region with
the political capital to 'qualify' for the post is strictly limited.
B) The politics, which this 'hyperpersonalisation' of the institution breeds, is in its very nature
particularist and also tinged with authoritarianism. Gel'man has adopted O'Donnel's category
of "delegative democracy" – the strong executive power and weak parties that have
characterised new democracies in Latin America – for the "regional regimes".16 Politics must
                                                          
11 Krasner 1984, 67.
12 ibid, 76-77.
13 It is useful to speak of regionalisation as an "atomisation" to emphasis the dual nature: the political
    domination of the regionand the concomitant weakness of the federal centre.
14 Linz 1990.
15 See Heinemann-Grüder 1997.
16 Gel’man /01(*+23(&3$-3,&*(124(567$-3 '&8*+$+$9*::&), Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 13/9/96; O’Donnel
     1994.
concentrate on the charismatic qualities of contenders. The candidate is his own programme.
The krepkij chozjajstvennik17 (strong manager) – the offspring of this politics – promises with
his (personal) know-how and know-who to restore stability in the region. This charismatic
politics can only be particularist, since the personal "magical" is coupled with the region. The
political discourse of the region cannot accommodate extra-regional themes:
Enough of the fruitless debates, enough of the political ambitions, enough of the plaguing of the
inhabitants of the region (...) red, white, green-which colours haven't been on the flags of our regional
politicians, but the main thing is something different: what can they do and what do they do to bring the
region out of a dead-end? A depressed region should blossom.18
Whereas the power of O'Donnels delegative democrats is unstable, since in the face of
intractable problems their myth quickly fades and broken promises cause disillusionment and
bitterness, that of the regional "presidents" is intrinsically stable: on the one hand, the
responsibility for intractable problems is assigned to the centre and consequently legitimates
the Gubernator, who struggles manfully to set things right. On the other hand, through
pursuing particularistic, populistic politics (price-controls etc.), the Gubernator can attain a
certain stability at the cost of macro-economic destabilisation, at which point the struggle for
regional stabilisation starts over again.19 The promised 'stabilisation' turns out to be the
stabilisation of the regional regime. The promises of the regional president are self-fulfilling,
the regional population is a willing kidnap victim that shares in the ransom.
C) The concept of 'regional stability' also includes political consensus, which the Gubernator
actively manufactures through his mediation/intervention in all political organisation:
independent political groups are either incorporated or indirectly or directly suppressed.
Currently certain curious – but as experience shows – very effective methods for winning over regional
functionaries and activists of different movements and parties have become fashionable among
Governators. They install chambers in which the representatives of any somewhat influential political
organisation are represented, create accords for social unity in the region, and take further similar
measures.20
Moreover, continuity of administration also secures stability: the Gubernator exploits the
blurred boundaries between person and position to secure his re-election. Gubernators lose, as
a rule, by a small margin and win landslides.
The Gubernator regards the autonomy of communal government with extreme suspicion and
accuses them of thwarting him in the fulfilment of his mission. The suppression of any such
independent instances exacerbates the "atomness" of the region.21
1.1.2 The Region as Institution
A) The Federal Subject
1) Size: The smallness of the regional unit – averaging 1.9 million inhabitants – sets limits to
its development as a political space. There is no other federal system with such small subjects,
apart from Switzerland. This seemingly banal fact entails a host of implications:
                                                          
17 See Medvedev 1997.
18 See Šutov 1997, 564. The quotation is from a campaign speech of the sitting governor Ajackov.
19 See Hanson 1993 for macro-economic stabilisation as collective good.
20 See Šutov 1997.
21 See Wollmann 1996; Gazier 1994; Sakwa 1996, 225.
• Within the limits of the region, bundling of interests does not occur, since there are no
broad interests, which must bundle to lobby. The very smallness of the region means
furthermore that large single interests (i.e. giant factories) enjoy direct access to the
regional instance and have no incentive to organise. Their political action is opportunistic
and takes place behind-the-scenes.
• Such regions can be easily dominated by the political authorities. The communal
administrations are too few to concertedly resist the control of the region, instances of
political competition can be nipped in the bud. The space of the region encourages such
behaviour: were it not possible, the Gubernator would have to adapt to political
competition. As I shall further argue, the region is instead an eminently monopolisable
space, a compact and controllable unit, an object (and a subject) of possible claims.22
2) Urban hierarchy: This general lack of differentiation within the region is greatly
exacerbated by the fact that the regional capital, with on average 40% of the urban population
– ca. 25% of the total – dominates the region.23 On the one hand, the regional administration
must keep the communal self-government on the tightest of leashes lest the main city slips out
of control. On the other, if the regional administration can achieve a high degree of control
over the city, it has already won the battle for the region
By the same token, political cleavage in the region is translated into city-region conflicts over
competencies, not least due to countryside-city conflicts. Such conflicts – labelled the mor
merov, i.e. the bog of mayors – have been a feature of the regional scene.24 Indeed, the
majority of cases where such a conflict does not make its presence felt bear witness to the
factual monopolisation of the region by its administration. In most of these conflicts, the
regional authorities retain nevertheless the upper hand, considering the largest city being the
seat of the regional administration. Political conflict is subsumed by this structural flaw.
3) Administration: The region is in its essence not a political, but an administrative unit. As a
territorial instance of the state, it is responsible for a broad spectrum of administrative tasks,
basically for the maintenance of its 'contents'. The maintenance of the region is extremely
difficult. Especially in coping with the classic crises of winter and the harvest the regional
authorities are under great pressure, since they must supervise the supply of the most
elementary needs: food, electricity, heating, fuel. The real source of the political importance
of the region is therefore its administrative character in times of crisis. Two further features
must be mentioned:
• The region, due to its administrative nature, has a vital role in the regional economy,
securing the conditions for its reproduction.
• Federal instances become 'regionalised', since they are usually dependent on the regional
administration for the very basics: accommodation, payment etc.25
                                                          
22 Medvedev 1995, 6.
23 Calculated on the basis of the OMRI Russian Regional Report.
24 See Gelman 1996, also Kommersant’ no. 8, 4/3/97, Regiony prosjat ognja.
25 Wallich 1994, 9.
Political life is dominated by administrative themes, the most basic of which is the securing
(*;3:<3 =3(&3> of daily life. This further demobilises the region in two ways. Firstly, politics
is particularistic, critic restricts itself to the success or failure of the administration to
administrate. Secondly, the personalisation of politics is exacerbated: Administrative
experience and proven capability are essential. Political newcomers are branded as
inexperienced, therefore dangerous for the region. Supposed administrative know-how is,
however, synonymous with know-who, with social capital.
Simply as head of administration, the Gubernator has in fact a great deal of power over the
region, and can in effect drive out anyone refusing to comply with the rules of the game
(pravila igry). The threat of constant obstructionism such as the cutting off of electricity, the
refusal of licences, arbitrary taxation etc. force even powerful international structures such as
Gazprom to enter into negotiations with the Gubernator of any region where they might
operate.26 Similarly, the regional media are defenceless against arbitrary administration.27
In this way the institutions of the region and the region as institution combine to make an
atom of the region.
B) The Federal Subjects
The reverse side of the smallness of the regions is, of course, their sheer number – 89. One
basic result is that collective action between all regions as regions does not occur. Instead,
regions act alone, or endeavour to build groups, which however because of the difficulty in
overcoming interest divergences as well as free-rider dilemmas stay weak. Three such groups
have been noted: 1) territorial groups 2) republics (status) 3) donor regions (financial).
The territorial groups have been formed on the basis of the Soviet economic zones. From the
8 groups, the Sibirskoe Soglašenie (SS) has attracted most attention, since Siberia has
seemingly a well-defined interest in gaining a greater share of their natural resources.
However, even in this case Hughes has argued that it was not a well-defined common interest
but the overlapping of special interests within the group that strengthened the SS.28
Heinemann-Grüder has pointed out how an unequal share of resources as well as ethnic
differences hampered the middle-term consolidation of the association.29 Sakha, the strongest
of Siberian regions pursued its own interests while poor, agricultural regions – Altai Krai,
Altai Republik, Republik von Burjatija, Chakassija – were free-riders.
Steven Solnick has portrayed the republics as an interest group which defends its status.30 The
clarity of their common interest overcomes the diversity of the group, which includes the
richest and poorest of Russian regions. However, it is not necessarily clear that there is real
collective action: the group is only recognisable as such by the common status of the
                                                          
26 See Segodnja 1/11/96 Sidanko uvleklas’ regional’noj diplomatiej.
27 See Kommersant’ Daily 16/8/96 Altajskie vlasti deljat mestnuju pressu, also OMRI Russian
    Regional Report 11/12/96 Local Press Runs Plummeting.
28 Hughes 1995.
29 Heinemann-Grüder 1996.
30 Solnick 1995.
republics, their common concern is purely defensive and, indeed, their status has never been
seriously questioned, not least because the ordinary regions have not been able to act together
to mount a concerted challenge to the republics' privileged status. The centre has a certain
interest in preserving such asymmetries as a "divide and rule" strategy. Moreover, there is no
need for collective action since – as Solnick describes – the two strongest republics –
Tatarstan and Sakha – are willing and able to bear the costs themselves of protecting their
status.
In the autumn of 1996 the donor-regions seemed to comprise a potentially powerful group.31
However, the centre can weaken such a group through the simple expedient of granting
privileges to single regions: thus, in January 1996 Sverdlovsk was struck from the list of
donors. Furthermore, the opaqueness of region-centre financial flows makes the establishing
of a common interest difficult. Thus, Moscow is seemingly the largest payer into the budget
and the main force behind the group. However, it is probable that the capital in fact extracts
large rents from the centre, by virtue of its lobbying power. The Moscow Mayor is often rated
as the most successful lobbyist in Russia. Since the budget is basically a zero-sum game, if
one donor pays less in, it is probable that the others will have to pay more. The group is
therefore unlikely to flourish.
C) The Federation
The number of the regions in conjunction with their atomisation and divergent preferences
means that the centre cannot effectively enforce its prerogatives. Since the regions have not
shown the ability to handle collectively, the only possible interaction between the single
regions and the centre are ad-hoc agreements, also labelled as 'bargaining-federalism'32 or
'hyperfederalism'.33 The fragmentation of the constitutional space is therefore a result not of a
lack of institutionalisation, but of the action of players within an institutional framework.
The smallness of the regions has a further consequence: the majority are financially dependent
on the centre. While this puts a fundamental strain on relations, it also puts a damper on
separatist movements. Furthermore, none of the donor regions, and only a small minority of
the other regions have an international border.
1.1.3 Social Capital in the Region
Putnam's institutionalist analysis of social capital shows how social networks can stabilise
expectations and therefore make action possible that otherwise would not have occurred.34
The peculiarity of this institution is that it exists only in and through the action of the
participants. Instead of Putnam's distinction between horizontal and vertical relations I prefer
to mate Bourdieu35 with Olson36 to distinguish between broad and narrow networks of ties.
Although I concentrate here on social networks in regions, I would argue that, theoretically,
                                                          
31 See OMRI Russian Regional Report 20/11/96 Donor Regions Demand Change in EconomicPolicy.
32 Kirkow 1997.
33 Sipdirov 1995.
34 Putnam 1993. As Putnam shows, this peculiarity means that the institution “trust” tends to dominate its
actors, perpetuating itself over long periods of time.
35 Bourdieu 1978.
36 Olson 1992.
they can be understood as regions in themselves, since the action they render possible is
basically monopolistic and oligarchic. The reasons for this are on the one hand the number of
participants which is restricted due to the risk of defection and free-riding, and on the other
the fact that social capital excludes.
Case studies have shown "the importance of context" – of regional networks – in determining
the political development of the region. The analyses of Weiss and Moses of the Volga region
of Saratov share a perception of the narrowness of social capital in the region.37 In Moses'
portrayal of developments until 1992, the hidden presence of a narrow network around
Kuznecov – a sort of godfather figure from the regional nomenclatura – was decisive. The
most important positions were taken by members of this group although Kuznecov himself
had no official position. The excluding practice of social capital showed itself in the agitation
against the returning Volga Germans. Narrow social capital gives rise to bitter conflicts
because it must exclude in order to survive. After 1992, such conflicts escalated. Stoner-
Weiss relates them to "narrow and personalistic"38 svazi. Finally, the Gubernator Belych and
six leaders of communal administrations were removed at one swoop due to corruption, a fact
which also shows the eventual vulnerability of narrow social capital.39
?($ 6*(0-1:0@$ &($%& '(&)$%*+,*-*.$ :*6&12$ 61<&012$ &:$ ;-*1.$1(.$<-*.A63:$ 6*(:3(:A:$ -1073-$ 071(
conflict40: Narrow social capital hides and agitates, broad social capital lets itself be
'misrecognised' by means of the reification of the region, what Bourdieu calls "di-vision".41
The elite's position is self-legitimating: its members seem the only people capable of
stabilising the region and protecting 'regional' interests at the centre. These 'facts' however
ignore that these capabilities stem from their social capital which simultaneously prevents
others from acceding to power. Maintaining regional stability implies preserving the stability
of their position; behind the term "regional interests" lie in fact their own interests. In
Sverdlovsk, there seems to be a similar consensus:
The successful mobilisation of power resources was attributable to the cohesion displayed by the regional
elite during this process. Elite cohesion grew out of the informal ties that had existed among regional
political and economic actors in the Soviet period. These informal ties cut across the post-communist
political institutions facilitating the co-ordination of goals, strategies and tactics.42
The prime example of a region 'colonised' by social capital is Primor'e. A narrow, but tightly-
knit clique managed to drive out or suppress opposition as well as attain a certain regional
hegemony, whereby their account of the critical state of regional affairs was believed by the
local population rather than the account of Moscow politicians.43 In Uljanovsk a Soviet 'clan'
managed this even without the conflicts which arose in Primor'e:
B73$8*:0$ (*0*-&*A:$ 3C18<23$ *D$ 1$ .5(1:05$ D-*8$ 073$E-3 '(3+$ 3-1@$ *D$ <10-*(-client relationships and an
autarkal regional economy is to be found in the Oblast' Uljanovsk. The Gubernator of the region, Jurij
F*-10G =*+@$H&-:0$/36-301-5$ :&(63$IJKL@$71:$ DA22$ 6*(0-*2$*+3-$ 073$1,-1-&1($621(@$ 7&8:32D$1<<*&(0:$ D3.3-12
                                                          
37 Moses 1994.
38 Stoner-Weiß 1995, 155.
39 OMRI Regional Overview: Saratow Oblast’.
40 Stoner-Weiß 1995.
41 Bourdieu 1978.
42 Easter 1997, 635.
43 Kirkow 1995; for "hegemony" see Segodnja 3/8/96 M3,3(.5$&$8&D5$N124(3,*$O*:0*6P1$-1Q.-1 '1)A0
    Moskvu.
officials, controls the creation of parties and can boast the lowest consumption prices in Russia between
1992 and 1994.44
1.1.4 The Institution of the Regions: The Federation Council (FC)
The prerogatives of the FC are considerable. Primarily responsible for matters directly
concerning the regions and republics, it has other prerogatives which, as Sakwa remarks,
would more normally be entrusted to the lower house, such as the introduction of a state of
emergency or military action abroad.45 Legislation requires an absolute majority to then
proceed to the President, thus relieving him often of the need to veto populist bills. A two-
thirds majority in both houses is necessary to override the veto; with impeachment of the
President the Upper House has the same weight as the lower.46 Thus, the FC is a buffer for
the President against the Duma.
In the absence of the party groupings which play a role in the Duma the main political
question with respect to the FC is whether the regional representatives act together and thus
instrumentalise the institution or merely use the FC as a forum to lobby alone.47 Before the
regional elections in 1996, the latter was the case. It is not yet clear whether the increasing
corporate identity of the group of Gubernators and the gains, which collective action amongst
the Gubernators could yield, might change this situation.
1.2 Independent Variable 1: Institutionalisation as a Trash-Can Cascade
The flip-side of institutional stability is eventual institutional crisis. The stickier the
institution, the stickier its end. Krasner has drawn an analogy between institutional crisis and
the concept of "punctuated equilibrium" taken from Stephen Gould's rethinking of
evolution.48 In crisis – literally a turning-point – contents of the old order fuse with
improvisations to form a new order. Crisis is at once the end of one order and the birth of a
new one.
Krasner points to two aspects of crisis:
• Crisis-ridden institutions rarely disappear, rather they undergo a rapid cascade of changes
as serial solutions for the crisis are sought. I describe this sequence as a trash-can cascade;
trash-can solutions are improvised ones, dictated by what is at hand rather than what is
optimal. They are often characterised as "solutions" waiting for problems.49
• "Latent" institutions, remaining stable despite the crisis, move forward to become the
foundations of a new order.
Thus, this conceptualisation is congruent with the logic of historical institutionalism in that
there is no Archimedes' point from which a new order is to be constructed, rather institutions
are a rare resource never discarded, but recycled in new settings. There is no reason to expect
                                                          
44 Kirkow 1995b, 1010.
45 Sakwa 1996, 131.
46 ibid.
47 Medvedev 1997.
48 Krasner 1984, 240.
49 See March/Olsen 1989.
that the new order will be flawless or intrinsically better than the past. The outcome of crisis
is unpredictable and with hindsight can be seen to have been influenced by occurrences which
at the time were hardly remarked upon.
These two components of crisis and change constitute my independent variables for the
dependent variable state-structure.
1.2.1 The Creation of the Regional Institutions as a Trash-Can Cascade50
A) Elections to the Soviets
ProblemR$ F*-;1 =3+:$ -3D*-8$ <*2&0&6:$ S1:$ 6*(D-*(03.$ S&07$ &(6-31:&(,$ *<<*:&0&*($ 1(.
decreasing discipline in the Communist Party (CP). It became clear that the existing Party was
the core of the problem.51
ResourceR$F*-;1 =3+$71.$6-3103.$D*-$7&8:32D$1$:0103$<*:&0&*($T$073$<-3:&.3(65$T$&(.3<3(.3(0
of the party.
Solution: The Soviets were a trash-61($ :*2A0&*(@$ &"3"$ *(3$S1&0&(,$ D*-$ 1$ <-*;238"$F*-;1 =3+
instrumentalised them to circumvent the party. One might say that the democratising wave of
1988/89 was triggered by these remnants of the revolution. This development was remarkably
similar to the calling of the Etats General in 1789.
Trash-can solutions as a response to crisis are seldom stable: the Etats General
institutionalised, yet isolated the Third Estate; the French Revolution ran its course from this
point. The revival of the Soviets triggered on one hand a trash-can cascade in the regions, on
the other hand, one can see with hindsight that it confirmed the Soviet regional division.
The sub-optimality of this improvised solution soon became clear: instead of a strengthening
of central state power the new institutions were mostly taken over by the old executives in
122&1(63$S&07$073$83(3.' 3-:@$S7*$D1-$*A0(A8;3-3.$073$7*<3.-for new reformers in the new
institutions.52
The new-old institutions, while failing to strengthen the state, massively weakened the party
in providing an exit option. The party was soaked up by the Soviets: a further effect of this
was that oppositional forces were deprived of the common opponent that had been effective in
uniting them for the elections in Moscow and Leningrad.53 These developments – the 'coming
to power' of reformers in Petersburg and Moscow and the decomposition of the party as a
hierarchical structure elsewhere – played an important role in the failure of the coup in August
1991.
B) After the coup attempt: The individualisation of the institutions of the regions
Problem: The failing authority of the central (Russian) organs in the regions became clear as
the first reform measures, especially changes in land-ownership and agrarian matters got
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bogged down. The old regional leaders remained in control in most localities. During the coup
most Soviets did not protest the imposition of a state of emergency and some directly
criticised the Russian leadership.54
Resource: After the failure of the coup El'cin seemed to have considerable resources at his
disposal. His omission to introduce a new constitutional order at this point has often been
remarked upon.55 However, this omission is understandable within the logic of a trash-can
cascade. There was absolutely no immediate reason to do so: the Soviet had been the closest
ally of the presidency until that point and there had been no conceptualisation of what sort of
order might replace it. In contrast, in the regions there was a problem, resource, and a sort of
solution.
Solution: In the months before the coup plans had been made for the dispatching of
Presidential Representatives (P.R.s) to the regions. The original thought was to maximise the
resources of the reformers.56 In most regions reform groups had been formed-often within the
new Soviets. These were now to be institutionally "tapped": the doubled individualisation of
the regional institutions – P.R.s and elected Gubernators – arose through just this desire to
maximise scarce resources.
This blueprint was, however, finally realised quite differently. While P.Rs were almost all
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with the intense opposition of the Soviets, as oppositional Soviet chairmen were displaced by
recognised reformers in several regions. The example of Nemcov was to have become the
rule: he drew attention to himself during the coup and was installed as Gubernator and P.R. in
%& '(&)$%*+,*-*."$?0$-381&(3.$7*S3+3-$1($3C63<0&*("
Since the abolition of the democratically-elected Soviets could not be countenanced, new
institutions had to be built on to them. The Soviets obtained an input in the process of naming
the Gubernators, which resulted often in the chairman of the Soviet assuming the newly
created position. However, reform groupings in the Soviets could often also block the first
choice of the Soviet and achieve at least the appointment of reform-orientated Nomenklatura
members.57
The function of the individuality of the institution was refigured in the face of these
developments. In November 1991, the electability of the Gubernators was suspended and
presidential representatives dispatched to all regions. The Gubernator was thus to become a
hostage of the centre, who could be monitored and held responsible for the execution of
presidential decrees.
Further development: The PRs rapidly lost all importance in the region, having no real roots.
The usual competition between executive and legislative in many cases developed into a form
of a dualistic fusion of powers.
C) After the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet
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Problem: The Soviets had again proved themselves unreliable during the events of October
1993. Around half of them had sided with the Supreme Soviet, a decision which was often
also influenced by the regional rivalry with the Gubernator and instinct for institutional self-
preservation.58
Resource: After the dissolution of the Upper Soviet El'cin had a free hand relative to the
regional Soviets. Since there was now, in contrast to 1991, in the region a factor-the
Gubernator – with a clear institutional interest in the removal of the Soviets – the majority of
Gubernators had indeed sided with El'cin – as well as the capacity to do so, the president
could now leave it to them to disband the legislative bodies.
Solution: The Gubernators were not only resource, but also the solution to the problems of
federal power in the region, since they constituted established authorities more or less loyal to
the centre, which had in many cases already developed a fusion of power. They were
consequently formally endowed – in practice often a confirmation of existing practice – with
very broad powers including budgetary prerogatives. Thus, they were massively strengthened
relative to the legislatives, which were to be restricted in size, and in which members of the
administration could sit.59 Moreover, the Gubernator was to remain unelected in the
meantime, the centre theoretically retained the right to replace him at will.
D) After the presidential elections of July 1996
Problem: Due to the considerable powers of the Gubernators, reinforced by their membership
of the FC, their legitimacy became problematic. More importantly, Gubernators themselves
were pushing for elections to be held using their considerable powers to create support both
for the holding of elections as well as for their own election and in some cases threatening to
hold their own elections, if the centre prevaricated any longer. In a minority of cases
individual Gubernators had already been elected, so the precedent was given. The centre was
threatened with the loss of its monopoly on elections that had been fatal for the Soviet Union.
Resources: The immediate aftermath of the re-election of the president was a favourable time
for proceeding with regional elections, since Moscow could devote its undivided attention to
obtaining favourable results, i.e. the candidates would have to come to terms with the current
administration and thus be more pragmatic; moreover, the Communists were weakened
organisationally and financially through their participation and defeat in the presidential
elections.
Solution: Gubernatorial Elections were held in the majority of regions in the Autumn of 1996,
yielding a crop of "pragmaticians" and professedly unideological "managers", prepared to
"co-operate with the centre in the furtherance of regional interests".
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1.2.2 The Creation of the Federation Council
Problem: After the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet a new constitution had to be introduced
to consolidate El'cins position while not exposing it to similar threats such as that which had
been posed by the Supreme Soviet.60
Resource: The resource was on one hand this temporarily unchallenged supremacy of El'cins
in the centre, which allowed him alone to shape the constitution to be put to the voters.
Solution: On the other hand, as argued, the Gubernators were – as the regional reform groups
had been in 1991 – the President's allies, and a solution waiting to be instrumentalised. The
double individualisation of 1991 corresponds to the double institutionalisation of the
Gubernators in December 1993, in the regions and in the Federal Centre. During the 1993
negotiations over a constitution, the President created a Federal Council to put pressure on the
Soviet, comprising representatives of the regional executives and legislatives and chaired by
the president himself.61 After the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, El'cin intended
incorporating this body – comprising appointees of the president – directly into the new
constitution.62 However, there was a clear risk that automatic membership of the Gubernators
in this body might make unavoidable their election in their regions, thus endangering the
loyalty of the Gubernators to the President and jeopardising his re-election. Provisional
elections for the FC in which the Gubernators could take part and in which they might be
fairly sure of victory were preferred to the possibility of holding full-scale regional elections
before the presidential.
The FC was equipped with considerable powers, giving rise to an institutional conflict with
the weak Duma. The FC is the unidentical twin of the "hyperpresidentialism", in that it, like
the presidency, was born of the need to block anti-Yeltsin opposition movements using
resources at hand.
The creation of the FC constitutes a classic example of the emergence and shaping of
institutions through short-term political calculations as well as for the interaction of cascades
– in this case of FC and Gubernators. Gubernatorial elections could not be postponed
indefinitely. However, they could be put on hold until the re-election of the president was
secured in 1996.
1.3 Independent Variable 2: The Region in the Soviet Union
As argued above, the same decision to reactivate the Soviets in order to circumvent the
Communist Party which triggered off institutional cascades ending in regional presidentialism
also confirmed the territorial division and inadvertently incorporated the Soviet regions in the
foundations of the new state.
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(...) Once a critical choice has been made it cannot be taken back. There may be a wide range of possible
resolutions of a particular state-building crisis. But once a path is taken it canalises future
developments.63
Clearly, in the new context the regions stopped being the Soviet regions. Thus "[a] particular
structural feature that evolved for one reason (...) can be put to very different use."64
However, just as clearly the way they bore their politicisation – their development as federal
subjects – was determined by their previous character. As Vladimir Kaganskij writes:
The regional system was not conceived for political activity: any "politics"further destabilised it and led
to the autonomisation of its elements. (...) politics became a game played on a regional field and political
forces had to fit into it – i.e. correspond to its constituent parts, the regions. Non-regional forces were
increasingly marginalised.65
To maintain an awareness of the contingency which characterised all these developments, it is
useful to consider contra-factual outcomes. Among other semi-autonomous Soviet
institutions, which could have come to the fore must be counted the military. Instead, the
military have played a comparatively unimportant role. Under other circumstances, one might
be faced today with militarised regions instead of a partially-regionalised military.
1.3.1 The Administrative-Territorial Divide (ATD)
In the most general terms, the Soviet Union was built around production for its own sake.
According to Verdery, the power of the system was based on its monopolisation of the means
of production rather than the reverse being true.66 The contradiction she describes between
power as the ongoing accumulation of the means of production and legitimacy through the
expansion of consumption, I would rephrase in Polanyi's terms. One can speak of a self-
regulating hierarchy premised on a fictional production: production for its own sake, an
autonomous dynamic of accumulation of means of production at the centre. Similar to
Polanyis self-regulating market, this dynamo always endangered its own reproduction, thus
forcing the development of some sort of defensive mechanism, a contra-movement. It is
necessary to envisage a "double movement":
It (the double movement) can be personified as the action of two organising principles in society, each of
them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its
own distinctive methods.67
One aspect of the contra-movement was the system of regional administration, that struggled
to ensure the reproduction of the production system that the Moscow ministeries comprised.
The subordination of reproduction to production led paradoxically to a huge burden being
placed on the system of administration. In the absence of non-state organisations state
instances had to penetrate society and space:
The effective functioning of this system in the enormous Soviet landmass required a certain territorial
arrangement. This was sought in the unique Soviet system of the "administrative/territorial
division"(ATD), a universal structure, embracing the entire territory of the former USSR. ATD was "a
system of multi-functional institutional units, a framework, in which all state functions were
performed"(Kaganskij). ATD was created to control the Soviet space with all its "contents", to organise
                                                          
63 Krasner 1984, 240.
64 Krasner 1984, 242.
65 Quoted by Medvedev 1995, 15. I will not discuss Kaganskij’s contention that regionalisation (initially in the
Soviet context) was the "bourgeois revolution" that put an end to the ancien regime.
66 Verdery 1995.
67 Polanyi 1957, 132.
the operation of state institutions as well as the people's everyday existence. The whole spectrum of state
activities (law enforcement, military draft, ideology, education, health care, housing, day-to-day
management of local industry and agriculture etc.) was carried out entirely on the regional level and
almost never went beyond it. All state functions were concentrated in the regions, which became focal
points, vital centres, "the cells of guaranteed survival of the local population." Regions did indeed emerge
as principal institutions of the state.68
State administration was therefore predicated on essentially military occupation principals:
concentrated power 'executed' the necessary tasks on a territorial "target". The region was no
natural entity, but an instrument for the securing of system-reproduction.69 One is therefore
justified in speaking of "the region" and not the "regions". A seemingly banal consequence of
this system of concentrated penetrative administration was the relatively small size of the
regions, dictated by the necessity of achieving crisis management within its borders.
The breadth of administrative responsibilities was huge. Administration comprised the
organisation of the daily life of the population. The term included the kommunal'noe
chozjajstvo, the bytovoe chozjajstvo, the extensive and exhaustively documented party
administration, coordination in the production sphere and policing.70 These manifold tasks
were executed by a single authority fixed on a region. This structure can be pictured as a
triangle where any two terms require the third.
Table 1: Structure of the Administrative-Territorial Divide (ATD)
Concentration of power in
one person
Comprehensive
responsibilities
(small) target territory
Since the method of administration – determined by the subordination of reproduction to
production – comprised a reactive crisis-management, the effective administration itself was
reduced to a semi-informal core centred on the First Secretary – Hough's Prefect – but whose
composition probably differed between regions according to economic specialisation.71 The
effective method of administration was highly arbitrary, its genius was the telephone, not the
typewriter.72 Ends justified means. Hough writes:
 [I]t is important to note that to a considerable extent the local Party organs carry out their responsibilities
by compelling administrators to break the law or to circulate some directive or plan indicator. (...) That so
much of the work of the local Party Organ involves compelling or authorising officials to violate the law
also helps to explain the real authority position of the local Party organs in Soviet society. Their ability to
compel illegal action is testimony to the extent of their authority, but the necessity for them to function in
this manner also produces the major limitations on their power.73
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1.3.2 The Region in the "Sectional Society"74
In short, the special power of the region derived from its powerlessness relative to the sectors.
The administrative structure I have outlined above only makes sense when the difficulty of
the administrative tasks – in face of constant emergency – are kept in mind. Against this
background, the region became the "life-cell" of the population. The most graphic illustration
of this endemic emergency provides the pattern of "underurbanisation".75
In his analysis of 1973 of political aspects of Soviet underurbanisation, Taubman
distinguished between new cities, smaller cities and regional capitals.76 Between 1926 and
1969, 94 new towns were founded most of which were company towns.77 The enterprises as
Q1P1Q=&P& (orderers of goods) looked after their workers but neglected any balanced
development of the town. A famous example of a company town was Magnitogorsk founded
in the 30s but still infrastructurally underdeveloped in the 70s.
"Nonetheless" the mayor continued, "Magnitogorsk remains what it was ten years ago – a company town,
a town where four major enterprises owned 65% of the housing; a city where the combine – controlled
water supply system was still insufficient, but where a new reservoir-connector was in its fourth year of
construction while industrial projects costing many times more were completed in much less time; a city
where combine-run transport still produced endless complaints that the Soviet could not act upon."78
Small towns offered their inhabitants 12% of the services per capita which large cities could,
the price of their inability to attract industry.79 Kuzma was a city with 13500 inhabitants:
As of 1965 no public buildings had been constructed in Kuzma for forty-eight years. The town's most
impressive structures – former homes of nineteenth-century merchants – housed the school, clinic and
cinema. Other buildings were flooded each spring as water rushed through city streets to the river. Kuzma
industry was the local variety – a cannery, a small dairy, a brickyard and (...) a kerosene shop. (...) Young
people were leaving Kuzma in search of vistas that the local school had opened but the town could not
deliver.80
In regional capitals, the same contradiction had opposite effect: the underdevelopment of the
infrastructure produced, for instance, chaos at rush hour due to the lack of means of public
transport.
The administration was responsible for the taming of the crisis without being allowed to
restrain production in any way. Its formal and effective responsibilities exceeded its formal
resources, therefore, it was forced to develop substitutes.
I have emphasised underurbanisation as one example of the permanent emergency which
regional administration had to cope with. Besides this aspect, underurbanisation shaped the
top-heavy urban hierarchy: the under-development of small cities and the over-development
of large towns were both caused by the imperative on maximising investment by minimising
infrastructural costs. Additionally, political centres could more easily win infrastructural
investments, which in its turn attracted industrial investment.81
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The regional administration mediated between the hard budget-constraints of the population
and the soft budget constraints of the ministries.82 A part of this task consisted in the šefstvo
(patronage) system, by which the Obkom (the Oblast party committee) asked the local
enterprises for direct help to overcome difficulties, especially at harvest-time, and for
construction work.83 The region was draped around the enterprises, big enough to hold them
in check, small enough to permit intensive co-operation. Furthermore, it was at regional level
that the agriculture and village-life in general was conjoined with the industrial-urban scene.
The regional centre – not rural raion centres – was the location for the majority of rural
services (training, construction, food processing, technological development, health care,
transport etc.) over and above the day-to-day needs. In 1977, 40% of Western Siberian
villager's non-food commodities had been purchased in the city.84
The Oblast' was also responsible for ensuring the supply of consumer goods. The "paradox of
podmena"85 entailed the obligation to 'extract' necessary goods and services for the region,
without actually interfering in the plan.86 Great effort was expended in the region in bringing
production and consumers together.
[C]ontributing to the classification of consumer goods as a regional problem was that while heavy
industry's output could be exaggerated into abstract national income figures, consumer goods and services
faced a reality test: they had to be delivered to specific consumers living in particular locations. As one
Soviet commentator put it, "people live, as it were, 'horizontally', not 'vertically."87
1.3.3 Social Capital in the Soviet Region
As I have shown, the reverse side of the fine-meshed territorialisation of the administration
was the informality and improvisation of its execution. Maximising the investment rate placed
huge demands on the mechanisms of reproduction while leaving minimal resources at its
disposal. All potential substitutes were mobilised, no matter of what nature. Informality was
from the very beginning incorporated in the Soviet system, to enable vital communication and
co-operation between formally separated groups.88 In the region strong ties between different
groups had to exist.
This fact seems to have been recognised in the Centre since the majority of First Secretaries
were appointed from within the Oblast' Nomenklatura. In 1980, 72 % of First Secretaries had
been promoted from a post in the Oblast', 60% of the First Secretaries had spent their entire
career in the Oblast', a further 21% most of their career.89
Furthermore, the politics of personnel – the Nomenclatura system – was practically the only
instrument for the middle-term direction of the region.90 However, such networks could only
ever be double-edged, helping the system but also helping themselves.91
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1.3.4 ATD as Herrschaft-Structure
Institutions as scarce resources under whose sway social action takes place are often
multifunctional. The ATD while being a counterweight to the structures of production, can
also be regarded as an integral, reinforcing part of the power structure which gave rise to the
'self-regulating hierarchy'. The structure is similar to Galtung's structural imperialism, in
which interaction is strictly vertical, between the individual peripheries and the centre, thus
securing the centre a monopoly on communication.92 90% of migration took place within the
region.93 This has surely had important consequences for the development of regional
identities, on which however little research has been done.94 Regional identity was soaked in
the centre-region polarity, not in region-region differences. Meso-regional identities were not
developed.95 One might speculate that one consequence of this is the post-Soviet fusion of
regionalism and nationalism, in as far as the Centre has become regarded figuratively and
literally as foreign.
That an awareness of the deeply problematic regional structure has long been present in the
centre indicate several plans for the replacement of the inherited regions by ten zemli
(amongst other ideas), labelled by Stephen Solnick "a nation-wide redrawing of the map that
would have unseated regional and republican elites alike."96 The implementation of such
plans has however never been seriously countenanced.
From a new institutional order, new actors emerge. The Gubernators/Mayors/Presidents
comprise perhaps the most homogenous group of actors in the Russian Federation, certainly
in comparison with the government and Duma. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic
research to the corporate identity of this group.
Some characteristics can be named: they are almost exclusively men, and, with certain
exceptions, Soviet-socialised, very often with a background in the production sphere. They
are also usually natives of their region. Charisma seems to be an important quality, much
remarked upon in Autumn 1996, and which might encourage a corporate identity – as
"guardians of the Russian people/keepers of the Russian state."
The Krasnerian understanding of institutional change explains regionalisation as the
reframing of the Soviet regions in a new state. The centripetal role of the party has been
replaced by the centrifugal institutions of the Gubernator. The weakness of the Soviet region
is the foundation of the current political strength of the federal subjects relative to the centre
and to its own contents; the resources developed to protect against the strength of production
now compensate for its weakness, simultaneously smothering independent political
organisation at the grassroots and threatening macroeconomic stability, and thereby producing
the reproduction of regionalisation. Regionalism is therefore at the heart of a Russian state
shaped decisively by the contingencies of the Soviet collapse.
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2 Regionalisation from an Economic-Institutionalist Perspective
2.1 Dependent Variable: The Reproduction of Regionalisation
Expressing regionalisation in terms of its reproduction through action seems somewhat
paradoxical, since it would seem that the reproduction of regionalisation should lead to the
collapse of the Federation. However, if regionalisation is thought of not in terms of
competition between single regions and the centre over prerogatives, but in terms of
competition among regions over the centre i.e. as rent-seeking, thus inflationary97, this
contradiction is resolved. Regionalisation thus constitutes a "separasitism".98 The dependent
variable is thus rent-seeking as a result of the code of property-rights and is best
instrumentalised by the analysis of case-studies.
2.2 Independent Variable: Evolution of Property Rights
2.2.1 The Administrative Market
Theories of transaction costs and principal-agent theory contribute greatly to understanding
the Soviet system. The question becomes "what form did trade take?", for as North replies to
Polanyi, price-forming markets merely constitute a special case.99 Simply put, such
approaches conclude that the command economy quickly "degenerated" into a market in
rights of use: The extensive growth, which the Stalinist hierarchy engendered, undermined the
same hierarchy, since the costs of co-ordination and surveillance grew geometrically.100 At
the same time, the possibilities for extensive growth (arithmetical addition of new production
factors, e.g. labour) were themselves naturally limited, and intensive growth was beyond the
capability of the system due to the costs of co-ordination and surveillance of complex
production processes. The rate of return fell. Thus, sanctions against horizontal transactions,
maximised during the Stalin era, decreased, at the same time as the returns on hierarchical
transactions fell. The command economy mutated into a bargaining economy, torg
(bargaining) became the main form of economic transaction.
This very progression was made possible up to a point by the maintenance of the appearance
of monolithicity: The monolithic nature – "signalled" by the Marxist-Leninist discourse101 –
was, in the absence of a principal with encompassing interest (after Stalin)102 or any possible
recourse to a third party103, all that maintained the value of the multitude of administrative
currencies circulating.104 It was valid as "meta-information"105, the self-fulfilling guarantee
that things would stay changing the same. The decline of confidence in these valuta in the
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Seventies was marked by a rise in corruption and increasing interest in hard currencies and
goods. Their value was propped-up through energy export revenues until the mid-80s; as
energy prices dived, bad money drove out the good: exchange in its previous form
collapsed106, but was reborn on the basis of the extended property rights of the agents,
operating on the one hand with barter, with dollars on the other.107
Agent's profit-curves differ according to the objects they control. Three basic types of objects
can be identified: convertible (property, funds); souveranisable (territories) and privatisable
(enterprises). Souveranisation takes place as the implosion of a "matrješka" hierarchy where
agents in their turn face dissolution from below, if they do not act immediately on signs of
weakness from the principal in the face of their own demands. One might offer this as an
explanation for why the end of communism was brought about by the collapse of the USSR,
in the words of V. Naišul why "the fish rotted from the head."108
Privatisation however seen separate from connected conversion procedures, is (qualitatively)
gradual and path-dependent, since it entails change in the property form (the enterprise).
Therefore, managers assuming control of Soviet enterprises are not content with control, but
require a continuation of subsidisation from the new state actors. This divergence in profit-
curves bears responsibility for a crucial misunderstanding between souveranising and
privatising agents.
2.2.2 Path-Dependent Change in Soviet and Post-Soviet Property-Rights
A) Change in Soviet Property-Forms
The organisation of enterprises is a function of the incentives entailed in the structure of
property rights. Property rights are therefore embedded in the organisation of the enterprise.
An inefficient enterprise reacts slowly and clumsily, if at all, to relative price-changes; along
what lines it changes depends on "how it is": change is path-dependent.109 Since governed by
the same institutional structure, the economy as a whole develops more or less path-
dependently.
To illustrate the relationship between organisation and change, I will briefly examine the
development of four Soviet property reforms.
The single-family apartment: It was the most efficient widespread Soviet property form, since
the disposer had a clear incentive to maximise its value. Naišul describes the development of
property rights around the apartment thus:
As far back as in the beginning of the seventies, the customary rights of a tenant of a state-owned
apartment guaranteed against his eviction under all circumstances. An apartment could also be legally
exchanged by mutual agreement for another one and inherited by relations living in it. This way de facto
privatisation of all of the housing stock of the country took place. Ten years later, these customary norms
were formally incorporated in the State Housing Code.110
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This "allodisation" of apartments was so advanced that the formalisation of private property
rights could follow in many cases (most notably Moscow) after 1992.
Kolchoz: The infamous inefficiency of Soviet agriculture can be related to the essentially
contradictory property form. In contrast to industrial enterprises there developed no strong
managerial structure.111 This "inertia" can be ascribed to the basic contradiction between the
rights of the agricultural workers and those of the farm which is basically conditioned by the
possibility of division of the land amongst the workers. Such communal property forms are
beset by gridlock: The Soviet agricultural property rights have changed little in the post-
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Industrial enterprises112: The lynchpin of the Soviet factory was the manager. He was
therefore in a strong position to expand his rights over the enterprise beyond the official
limits. The chozjajstvenniki (managers) created and drove on the development of the
administrative market, changing the organisation of their factories as they did so, introducing
0*2P1 =& (expediters for supply-procurement) etc.
Communal apartments: The fate of the communal apartments in the historic districts of
Petersburg and Moscow is of interest in this context. With booming property prices ever more
are being bought by property dealers to be reconverted into private flats for the rich. This is
possible in as much as the sums offered are sufficient for the inhabitants of the single rooms –
the under-privileged – to buy themselves an apartment elsewhere.113 The fate of communal
property forms is to be "swallowed up" by efficient ones.
 B) Post-Soviet Property Forms
If industrial enterprises were previously de-jure state-owned, but with managers enjoying
informal right on the administrative market, they are now de-jure privatised, de-facto partially
state-influenced (rent-receiving). The interested parties are:
V3(3. '3-114: His property rights base arise partly simply from his position: as "sitting
tenant" he can defend the enterprise from outsiders.115 However, probably more important is
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who) which he employs to keep the enterprise afloat.116 This knowledge binds the $83(3. '3-
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displaced, the replacement has usually come from within the ranks of the enterprise.
V31(S7&23@$7&:$ -&,70:$3(0&023$7&8$ 0*$1$ 21-,3$<1-0$ *D$ 073$ -3:&.A12"$ ?($ ,3(3-12@$ 073$83(3. '3-:
now exercise the right to receive income from property but not to change property. For this
purpose, the $83(3. '3-$assigns himself an extremely high salary and introduces features such
as satellite firms which channel off enterprise funds. While the $83(3. '3-$has obviously a
strong interest in keeping the firm above water – which demands maximal concentration –
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116 See Treisman 1995.
this interest does not necessarily extend to making a profit. Modernisation could jeopardise
the enterprises rent-seeking chances (through reduced work-force and social ballast) as well
as the position of the $83(3. '3-$(making him at once vulnerable and expendable).
Workforce: Similarly, the rights of the workforce are predicated on position and person. As
sitting tenants the trudovoi kollektiv – the work force as shareholders – is allied with the
83(3. '3-$against outsiders. The rights which arise through person relate to the rent-seeking
capability of the enterprise: the potential job-losses and social distress. The workforce receive
payments and are interested in the survival of the enterprise along as no better employment is
on offer, but not in its modernisation.
State: The confused muddle of legal ownership points to the absence of final ownership
claims which itself indicates that a bundle of rights remain with the state. If one accepts that
property rights are always in equilibrium, then one can assume that enterprises' budget
constraints have not hardened, since in that case all involved would give up their claims.117
The state contributes rents – nowadays primarily in the form of toleration of tax-defaulting – ,
and receives a tribute of political passivity. The contract of the state with $83(3. '3-$ and
workforce around the enterprise comprises the supply of rent in exchange for tax and political
passivity.
This constellation of claims to the enterprise constitutes an evolution of Soviet rights. The
83(3. '3-$ has expanded his rights and won the norma neuvol'nenija118 -immunity from
sacking – denied him previously. Conversely the previously-observed immunity from sacking
valid for employees has now been qualified.119
This evolution can be expressed as a continuing decline in transaction costs which nonetheless
remain extremely high. Just as a strong police/state is vital for the maximisation of transaction
costs – the maintenance of hierarchy – a strong law/state is necessary for their minimisation –
the maintenance of markets.120 This decline has been driven on by the $83(3.' 3-5 to the
present point which might well constitute an optimalisation of their possibilities, in that the
administrative "bazaar" initially privileges position and person but subsequently privileges
investments in information and new forms of networking.121 Further evolution might well
leave the $83(3. '3-5 behind, as financial groups appropriate potentially profitable branches,
and workforces desert moribund plants.122 Their most important margin is the possibility of
obtaining state rents or of escaping from the state altogether (operating informally).
                                                          
117 Barzel 1989.
118 See Naišul Segodnja 23/5/96 O normach sovremennoj rossiskoj gosudarstvennosti.
119 G. Klejner, referring to the privileging of person and position in this constellation of property-rights, has
labelled the Russian economy an "economy of physical persons“ (as opposed to legal persons). See Klejner
1996.
120 Segodnja 6/6/96 [P*(&8& =3:P1)1$<*2&0&P1$.2)1$-*::&:P*)$3P*(*8&P&, Segodnja 2/2/96 Chorošego gosudarstva
.*2 '(*$;504$""":P*24P*\@$Segodnja 24/7/96 ],-*Q1$3P*(*8& =3:P1)1$;3Q*<1:(*:0&$9*::&), Segodnja 24/5/95
E3Q$F*:A.1-:0+1$:*;:0+3((*:04$:AG =3:0+*+104$(3$8* '30.
121 The Russian political economy I view as an "information game": "The central paradox of bazaar exchange is
that advantage stems from surrounding oneself with relatively superior communications links, links that
themselves are forged in a sharply agonistic interaction in which the existence of information imbalances is
the driving force and their exploitation the end." Geertz, 1978, 221.
122 Linz/Krueger 1996, 415; McFaul refers to the post-privatisation allocation of property rights as "the first
round”, McFaul 1996.
2.3 Intervening Variable 1123: The Region as Kryša
While property-right approaches portray equilibrium, rent-seeking explains how this
equilibrium is reached.124 I turn now to this aspect.
An important article about the emergence of Mafia structures in Sicily and Russia
distinguishes usefully between demand for and supply of private police-protection.125 Such
protection is often referred to in contemporary Russia as kryša, literally "roof".126 I extend the
term to cover the provision of rent to protect property-rights. Among the leading suppliers of
kryša in this broader sense are the regions, who can instrumentalise their territoriality to
produce rents for their constituents.
Interaction between centre and regions constitutes a two-level game127: the Federation and
the regional authorities on one level and on the other the region and its constituents and the
Federation and its constitutents. In this game, three differences from Putnam's classic
description can be identified:
• the Federation bears a final responsibility for the constituents of the region (thus, the cost
*D$073$S1-$&($^3 =()1$D*-81225$6*8<-&:3$073$6*:0:$*D$073$S1-$1(.$073$-36*(:0-A60&*(>"
• The particular federal instance is not obliged to inform its constituents (i.e. other regions
and federal instances) about the outcome of negotiations (the bilateral treaties were not
published) and therefore has a broad win – set (i.e. the participant can afford to be
generous in negotiations, since there are few constraints on his behaviour).
• The game is iterative (which increases the importance of the first condition).
Therefore, a region has a strong hand in negotiations if it has the concerted support of its
constituents behind it, and therefore a narrow win-set. The federal instance is bound to
recognise that sanctions against the regional authorities are useless, if the constituents persist
in their opposition. It is instead obliged to reach a compromise, whose details are however
kept secret from the Federations' own constituents, thus eliminating the need for embarrassing
explanations. The territorial pairing of the regional authority and its constituents on one hand,
the centre on the other, is decisive, since it makes for an iterative game: the demands and the
win-set remain the same from one round to the next; the regional administration becomes a
"01-1(@$ =0*;5$+5;&0_$.3(_,&"128 ('a ram to beat out money').
The regions also provide rents independently: "The essence of property-rights is the right to
exclude", writes North.129 Since challenges to the property-rights of the $83(3.' 3-5 come
mostly from outside (from portfolio groups and banks) the region can afford its enterprises
direct protection. Additionally, the region provides rents through import and export
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restrictions and restrictive licensing practices, to name only a few possibilities.130 However,
the capacity to provide such rents depends in the last instance on the strength of the region
vis-à-vis the centre. Hence, a strong region has far more room for manoeuvre.
2.4 Intervening Variable 2: Collective Action in the Region
The stronger the organisation of the constituents is, the better the position of the region
relative to the centre (since the narrower its win-set). Kryša is therefore in fact as a function of
the organisation of the regional constituents a collective good, which experiences all the
problems connected with collective action.131 Within the region kryša is inclusive – the larger
the group the better for all members.132 I will refer to such organisation as tyl (support,
backing, lobby).
Collective action problems can be resolved quickest amongst a numerically small group: from
this fact alone it is not surprising that collective action after the weakening of the ministerial
structures occurs in regional groups. All-Russian lobbies, insofar as they have emerged at all,
have been noticeably weak.133
The probability of collective action corresponds with the potential gains on the one hand, the
uniformity of interest amongst the constituents and their number on the other. A small number
of similarly positioned constituents will organise quicker than a larger number with diverse
interests. The potential reward, which relates to the pressure which the group can bring to bear
on the centre, bases on objective factors, such as the economic importance of the region, the
size, the geographical position, contacts in the centre and the competition between suppliers
of kryša (city vs. region).
From this, one can logically conclude that organisation will be most likely in city -regions
which are also political centres and have a large population. Urban-rural and region-city
conflicts of interest do not occur, there are ample opportunities for lobbying. The "weight" of
Moscow is therefore not surprising. In mono-cultural regions like Sakha or Samara is
organisation hardly even necessary. Since organisation is most likely where the rewards are
highest, one can assume a double divergence between rich and poor regions: rich regions are
politically far more "regionalised" than poor ones relative to the centre. Additionally, poor
regions are more likely to experience a rural-urban conflict of interests. One can therefore
expect a double-divergence between strong and weak regions.
The regional instance has consequently a vested interest in organising its constituents around
it. The region is no "empty core", collective action is actively encouraged by the authorities
by means of positive and negative selective incentives.
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Table 2: Collective Action in the Region
kryša tyl chozjajn
Protection
Region lobbies for rents
for constituents
Back-up, support
Constituents organise to
push and support region's
lobbying for rents
Boss
Region uses selective
incentives
(inclusion/exclusion from
rents) to organise
constituents to its benefit
and increase value of its
kryša
Analogous to the Mafia, which supplies kryša while creating a demand for it, the region acts
as a chozjajn (e.g. a manager, patriarch, boss) by extracting rents from the enforcement of
selective incentives. Its role as kryša (protector) shades into its role as chozjajn (boss). The
constant conflicts between region and constituents arise from the attempts of the region to
push up the price of its kryša. Organisation in the region is taken over and managed by the
region.
2.5 Case Studies
Regionalisation is a two-level game. Games in the region and games between regions and
centre are interconnected. Preferences are determined by the property structure, capacity by
organisation. In these case studies I sketch the specific configurations of tyl, kryša and
chozjajn. The case-studies are diachronic, conflict-orientated and designed to show the
reproduction of regionalisation. The chronological emphasis lies between 1994 and 1996,
culminating in the more aggressive attitude of the centre under pressure of the IMF towards
073$ -3,&*(:$ *D$UA0A8($IJJa@$ 38;*.&3.$ &($ 073$B38<*-1-5$[C0-1*-.&(1-5$b*88&003$ XO^c>"
Comparisons highlight differences in these constellations and correlating differences in
centre-region relations. The regions I have chosen are almost all "strong", which is partly due
to the nature of my sources, but also allows to determine what leads to "mature
regionality".134
2.5.1 Moscow
A) tyl
Advantages of the Capital: Out of all subjects of the Russian Federation, the best objective
conditions for collective action are given in Moscow: basically similar constituents (e.g. no
agriculture), a kryša monopoly plugged into the federal centre, and by far the largest
population (8 million) of all federal subjects.
B) kryša
Industry: The capacity of the mayor Yuri Luzhkov to deliver rents can be shown by the
example of the gigantic automobile-makers ZIL. With 70.000 employees and a productive-
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capacity of 200.000 vehicles per annum, ZIL ranks among the biggest of Russia auto-
manufacturers. After 1992 its position has become extremely unstable. In 1993, it produced
108.000 vehicles, 1994 a mere 26.000. In the same year, it suffered losses of 12 billion
Roubles, its short-term debts multiplied by 15, long-term by five. It is clearly worse-off and
worse-managed than other automobile concerns, especially VAZ.135 Nonetheless, in 1994
and 1995 it was favoured with a whole series of state support-measures. That these were
denied the other plants can be ascribed to the lobbying weight of Moscow.136
U$ :36*(.$ 1A0*8*;&23$ ,&1(0@$ UdMc@$ &:$ 2*6103.$ &($ V*:6*S"$ B73$ O^c$ T$ 073$ _B38<*-1-5
Extraodinary Commitee' – installed in 1996 to improve tax collection did not touch the
Moscow automobile giants (or any other Moscow factory) although they are notorious tax-
defaulters.137 Instead, it concentrated its attention on the Tatar Kamaz truck plant and
AvtoVAZ in Samara (see below). The Russian automobile industry has however acted
together succesfully to enforce high import duties on automobiles.
Trade: Moscow – together with Petersburg and Ekaterinburg – has successfully blocked the
demands of the agricultural lobby for high tariffs on food imports.138 The asymmetry between
high tariffs on automobile imports and low ones on foodstuffs highlights the lobbying weight
of Moscow in the Federal centre.
Finance: Moscow has afforded the commercial banks kryša in the form of the system of
plenipotentiaries and the tendering-out of accounts.139 The creation of the plenipotentiary
status for the capital had to be carried out in the face of considerable opposition from the
Central Bank, since the Moscow accounts had made up one third of the resources of its
daughter bank Narodnij Bank. The matter was finally decided in Moscow's favour in April
1994, in which year the Moscow funds were worth 17 trillion Roubles, the favoured banks
thus massively improving their position.140 This system is as much chozjajn as it is kryša,
since the distribution of accounts is decided administratively and therefore includes an
element of control. The Moscow financial-sector, especially the 'Most Group', is the single
most important lobby in the city.141
C) chozjajn
Subsidies for capital-status: Although the financial flows between Moscow and the
Federation are extremely unclear, it is estimated that in 1994 92,2% of Moscow's total
demands were granted, while other regions received a mere 5%.142 Of especial importance
has been the compensatory payments for the carrying-out of capital-city functions, which
Moscow managed to push through in 1993, despite the fact that this status carries with it huge
advantages with respect to investment, property prices etc. These subsidies amounted initially
to 400 billion Roubles: by 1996, the Merie (mayor's office) was demanding 15.7 trillion
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roubles and received after tough negotiations 3.16 trillion (an increase certainly greater than
the rate of inflation). Reputedly, there were additional hard-currency subsidies worth $ 212.5
million in 1995.143 Moscow is therefore of a different order than other regions in the
resources it can distribute as chozjajn.
Privatisation: Moscow succeeded in implementing a special privatisation programme with
important consequences for the development of the city's political economy, despite the bitter
*<<*:&0&*($ *D$ 073$ .3<A05$ <-&83$ 8&(&:03-$ ^A;1):$ 1(.$ 073$ F*:A.1-:0+3((5)$ c*88&030
?88AG =3:0+1$ XFc?@$ 073$ :0103$ <-*<3-05$ 6*88&0033>"144 The outbreak of this conflict was
triggered by the suspension in Moscow on the 1. April 1994 of the privatisation of real estate
1(.$1($166*8<1(5&(,$D-33Q3$*($073$-3,&:03-&(,$*D$<-&+10&:3.$3(03-<-&:3:"$MA' P*+$&(:&:03.$*(
two points, which contradicted federal legislation:
• the land on which enterprises stood should not be sold with the enterprise but leased by
the city.
• enterprises should be sold for the maximum price, even if no taker could be found
immediately.
A presidential Ukaz (decree) of 6 February 1995 finally granted Moscow its own way with
privatisation. Basically Moscow was allowed:
• to determine the starting price according to the last quartal-balance.
• to lease the enterprises their land, providing regulations pertaining to land use were
observed.
• to ignore the time-limit set for completion of privatisation.
• to pay the 51% of the sale price not due to the region or Federation into a Moscow-Fund
for the sanitation of enterprises, instead of it going directly to the enterprise itself.
The motives for the Moscow Privatisation Programme were one the hand that property prices
in the city-centre had risen steeply, and on the other that the revenue from privatisation was to
be maximised at the cost of the speed of the process. At the same time, a strong element of
administrative control was built into the privatisation process, leverage was obtained over new
and old owners alike to ensure observance of the pravila igry (rules of the game). Long-term
leases were qualified by the requirement to comply with the administratively determined land-
use.
In short, the Moscow privatisation provided kryša for the industry, in protecting the rights of
the $83(3. '3-5 and for the banks, through the greatly increased financial resources of the city
(rents, revenue from privatised and yet-to-be-privatised enterprises), which the banks were
managing. At the same time, the power of the Merie as chozjajn relative to these groups
grew.145
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Conflict over ZIL: The conflict around the automobile plant ZIL demonstrates further the links
between land, management, ownership and control in Moscow.146 The plant – founded before
the First World War – still occupies a large site in the city centre. During the privatisation, the
trading society MICRODIN acquired 14% of the shares for an extremely favourable price of
$6 million, although it did not dispose of the resources to even start a sanitation of the factory
and the share packet did not suffice to obtain rights of control.147 Property speculation was
therefore conjectured to be the motive.
In the face of the catastrophic position of the plant it was generally recognised that the land
had to be in possession of the factory, to be used as collateral for potential investors. The GKI
and MIKRODIN demanded of the ZIL $83(3. '3-$ that they acquire the rights to the land
from Moscow. In April 1995, the chairman of MIKRODIN Efanov took over the direction of
the automobile plant, only to be replaced by a member of the old management in January of
the following year. This was a prelude to Moscow's buy-back from MIKRODIN for $ 6
million of the share-packet in July 1996, since which time the enterprise is in the care of the
city. Thus, the rights of the $83(3. '3-5 were protected at the cost of becoming dependent on
the Merie, who also maintained its claim to the rent from the land. This pattern of region
protecting enterprise against investors wanting control-rights in return for increased control
over the enterprise for itself has become classic.
The Merie understands itself increasingly as the "$83(3. '3-$of last resort" whose interest in
the management of firms can override those of the resident management.148 Tellingly Saikin,
former first-secretary of Moscow, was transferred from ZIL to the Moscow department for the
sanitation of enterprises, signalling the return of the city as 83(3. '3- . Thus, the kryša
becomes a chozjajn.
Conflict with banks: Similarly, the city has, by distancing itself from the banks, gained
leverage over them.149 Although the tyl of the banks was essential for gaining acceptance of
073$ <-&+10&:10&*($ <-*,-1883$ D-*8$ S7&67$ 0735$ :0**.$ 0*$ ,1&(@$ 073$ 815*-$ MA 'P*+$ .36&.3.
almost immediately to found a municipal bank, a decision which the increasing strength of
'Most Bank' might have inspired. The municipal bank has served mostly to give the Merie an
option independent of the commercial banks, which continue to hold city funds, and, thereby,
increase its leverage over them as chozjajn.
!"#"!$%& '(&)$%*+,*-*.
A) tyl
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The military industrial complex (VPK): Kathryn Stoner-Weiss has drawn attention to the
early formation of a core-group of VPK directors in the group and the importance of this for
the political development of Oblast':
?($%& '(&)$%*+,*-*.@$ 073$<-3:3(63$*D$1$6*-3$,-*A<$*D$1;*A0$ 0S3(05$.&-360*-:$*D$ 21-,3$1(.$36*(*8&61225
important enterprises quickly crystallised as a formidable political force. Recognising the importance of
opening a dialogue with this group of economic actors, shortly after taking office Gubernator Nemcov
and Oblast Soviet chair E. Krestianinov cruised for a few hours down the Volga on a river boat with the
region's leading enterprise directors. Their purpose was to present their policy platforms and to convince
this core group of enterprise directors that only through collective action could they achieve these goals.
In return, this core group of regional employers was assured access to regional policy instruments and
resources. (...) Although many of these enterprises were to be privatised and some directors saw this as a
threat to their control, in fact privatisation in the region was conducted in such a way that political
authorities were able to steer enough shares to labour collectives and enterprise directors so that most
were able to retain their positions. (...) In late 1991 and early 1992 the political leadership began
negotiating semiformal agreements. These documents were referred to as ,social guarantees". Some were
specifically designed to soften the burdens of key economic actors. In return these economic actors were
to provide political support and legitimacy to the political leadership.150
B) chozjajn
GAZ: Noticeable by its absence from the group was the GAZ automobile plant factory, which
with 100.000 employees dominates the oblast'$ 63(0-3$%& '(&)$%*+,*-*."151 The $83(3. '3-
Vidaev's actions during the privatisation – as much as Nemcov's reaction to his behaviour –
bear witness to the fact that he was not closely linked with the administration. An
investigation, which Nemcov initiated, ascertained that the director had misused a $1.5 billion
credit to buy up vouchers through third-parties. Nemcov could persuade the Prime Minister
^3-(*85-.&($T$ 1<<1-3(025$O&.13+_:$ :<*(:*-$ T$ 0*$ D&-3$O&.13+@$ 1D03-$S7&67$ 073$ 6*(0-*+3-:&12
shares-package was assigned to the region, and Nemcov consequently could appoint his own
man Nikolai Pugin, former director of the Soviet automobile industry, to the post of
83(3. '3-$ of the key-enterprise in the region.152 These developments show the worth of
Nemcov's tyl, which the successful "rough wooing" of VAZ greatly enhanced. This episode
S1:$ 073$ 3fA&+123(0$ D*-$ %386*+$ *D$ S710$ MA 'P*+_:$ -3S*-P&(,$ *D$ 073$ <-&+10&:10&*($ S1:$ &(
Moscow: it hugely strengthened the region vis-à-vis the centre and vis-à-vis its constituents.
GAZ constitutes an exception among Russian vehicle manufacturers in that it received a
thorough capital overhaul at the end of the 80s. This relatively advantageous position together
with the strength of the administration as chozjajn have been able to attract investments, most
notably an $85 million credit from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Redevelopment
(EBRD). GAZ has even succeeded in bringing a new truck model onto the market. Its brighter
prospects allow the region to pursue a fairly liberal policy.
Norsi-Oil: Norsi-Oil is the most successful example of a trend for the formation of regional
oil companies under the aegis of the Gubernator in the wake of the formation of vertically-
integrated oil companies (VICs).153 Norsi-Oil had to be protected by the region from the
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VICs, from the state-holding Rosneft as well as from Tatneft, the largest customer. Norsi-Oil
is the second-biggest oil-processing plant in Russia, and completely dependent on deliveries
of crude oil from other companies, which has posed seemingly unsurpassable problems. The
fact that it has developed from being one of the biggest tax-defaulters to paying regular tax
shows the effectiveness of Nemcov's kryša. 154
The Oblast' administration has further formulated plans for the formation of a regional
energy-sector financial-industrial group (FIG) to restore former chains of production in the
O*2,1$-3,&*("$B73$6*-3$*D$07&:$H?F$S1:$0*$;3$073$O*2 ':P*Yc18:P151$%3D01(1)1$c*8<1(&)1
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participate. This FIG was to secure a regular supply of oil as well as payments, for which the
resources of the Moscow banks were essential.
While regions are prepared to involve Moscow banks in regionally-based projects, they strive
not to lose 'their' enterprises to Moscow-based projects. In autumn 1996, Nemcov exerted
pressure to prevent the Moscow FIG Ruschim from appropriating three insolvent regional
enterprises, which were earmarked for the above interregional project. As chozjajn, the region
is concerned to stabilise the regional economy (tax) while integrating it as far as possible
(tyl).155
Organisation of tyl: the Oblast' managed to shift the ownership and control relations in the
region in its favour. Nemcov no longer relied exclusively on the VPK directors, since he had
succeeded in finding allies in the most powerful interests – the three biggest tax-payers:
• GAZ-Pugin was in control, the taxes constituted a quarter of regional revenue.
• Norsi-Oil was solvent again thanks to investment, new management and regular deliveries
from Tatarstan.
• B73$9Ug[[/$X32360-&6&05$8*(*<*25>$.1A,703-$ 6*8<1(5$%& '(*+3(3-,*$A(.3-$%386*+:
relative Boris Brevnov.
The news-magazine Itogi concluded that even were Nemcov's successor – after his departure
for a cabinet post in Moscow – to be a communist, this alliance would continue to dominate
the regions politics, and the Gubernator would find it in his own interest to comply with
Nemcov's course.156
Relations with the centre: Relations with the centre have been peaceful and marked by
considerable peaceful concessions to the region. Besides the removal of Vidaev and the kryša
over Norsi-Oil the financial arrangements with the centre attested to and enhanced the
"regionality" of the region. In January 1996, the President conceded that the Oblast's federal
taxes should be spent within the region and that – with the exception of the armaments
industry – federal share packets in regional enterprises were to be transferred to the region.157
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The regional administration gained concessions in the centre which increased its influence in
the region.
2.5.3 Sverdlovsk Oblast'
A) tyl
VPK: The Sverdlovsk industry is characterised by a large core of defence industry (VPK)
enterprises concentrated in Ekaterinburg. These enterprises are relatively uniform with regard
to sector (machine-building) and their position (ageing capital base).158 They have however
shown less inclination to organise than the metallurgical branch and the regional banks.159
Three reason congruent with collective action theory can be offered:
• The size of the group makes collective action difficult.
• As the third biggest Russian city Ekaterinburg has its own plans, and has often expressed
reservations about the politics of the region.160 The VPK enterprises are concentrated in
Ekaterinburg.
• Differences within the VPK – between enterprises on the list of strategically important
enterprises and those not on this list, the former not facing privatisation and lobbying
through ministerial structures.
Privatisation of the VPK: During the stage of the cash privatisation a not inconsiderable
number of enterprises came under the control of Moscow groups. Indicative for the absence of
a concerted Sverdlovsk industrial lobby is that the Gubernator Strachov was able to position
himself on the side of federal/Moscow interests.161
Financial sector162: The Sverdlovsk financial sector is of the same order of magnitude as
Samara and Petersburg thanks to the industrial concentration. The core of the sector are the
former Soviet state banks: six banks hold 2.8 trillion Roubles, Uralpromstroibank manages
the accounts of 90% of the industrial plants and is the plenipotentiary of the EBRD. Former
connections to the regional industry are still determining for the banks commercial activities.
The banks seem to be orientated to the region rather than to the capital city: the three biggest
were practically plenipotentiaries of the regional administration, whereas the city
administration operates through its own municipal bank. Thus, the banks would appear to
have the potential to constitute a powerful lobby on regional level.
The bank crisis of 1995 hurt the Sverdlovsk banks, as well; ground was lost to the Moscow
banks, which began opening branches, buying up troubled regional banks, and using the
information gained over regional enterprises to take control of them. This development was
the cause for vocal concern especially on the part of Uralpromstroibank. In November 1995,
profit-tax for banks was cut.163
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Aluminium-Industry164: In 1992, the Sverdlovsk branch of the Russian aluminium-industry
acted together to secure supply-chains against the break-up of the Soviet Union and thus
established themselves as a regional group over and above their differing sectoral/ministerial
allegiances. This organisation went on to lobby to secure the ownership relations through the
transfer of share-packets (15-44%) to a Ekaterinburg holding ALKUR instead of auctioning
them at investment auctions. The deputy prime-minister Soskovec was the sponsor in the
centre. Thus they avoided the fate of the copper enterprises, which were taken over by
Moscow-based bank Menatep.
The aluminium sector consists of ca. 15 companies scattered through out the region, often
within company towns. The core of the group is the smelting plant UAZ, on which the whole
chain depends, which however has been tempted by tolling contracts and suchlike. The
aluminium sector is, similar to the banks, an eminently organisable group, however also
vulnerable due to its dependency on UAZ.
Conflict over ALKUR165: As I have shown, the core of the aluminium lobby, UAZ was also
its potential Achilles heel, since the removal of control over it from within the region would
cripple the whole Ural aluminium industry. Such a conflict broke out in the summer of 1995.
This conflict was also an example of the extent with which regional politics are affected by
world commodity markets: the sharp rise in world market prices for aluminium oxide caused
a crisis in the east Siberian aluminium industry, which is dependent on deliveries from
abroad. The otherwise disadvantaged Ural industry disposes of reserves of aluminium oxide,
which suddenly became attractive to Moscow and foreign interests doing battle in Siberia.
In June 1995, ALKUR was included in a Moscow holding ALKOR behind which stood the
bank Rossiskij Kredit, and which quickly moved to take over UAZ, clashing bitterly with the
management, who had allied themselves with the American Ekaterinburg-based Renov
Consortium and with Eduard Rossel, the challenger in the simultaneously occurring
gubernatorial election. However, the conflict was quickly ended, mainly as ALKOR
recognised that with Rossel's pending victory the situation had changed. In the breathing
space, afforded by the retreat of the Moscow holding, the enterprises and region lobbied for
the dissolution of the Soskovec-sponsored ALKOR, which was then granted by Alfred Koch,
chairman of the GKI.
B) chozjajn
The regional economy: The regional administration denied UAZ its wish to transfer the
ALKUR shares to a Ural financial-industrial group, instead acquiring itself all of the ALKUR
shares, thus considerably strengthening the region's role in the aluminium industry.166 Again,
one sees how the region by acting as kryša for its constituents gains leverage over them. The
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region actively supported the industry as a whole, supporting the loss-making bauxite-
extracting enterprise SUVR, since it was integral to the chain of production.
The region has furthermore sought to make possible the creation of FIGs on a regional basis
in the hope of thus being able to access Moscow capital for investment without losing control
over enterprises or tax revenue from the region. A flagrant example for chozjajn constitutes
the introduction of regional export duties for copper to stabilise regional supply chains in the
autumn of 1996.167
Conflict with the centre: 1995 proved to be a watershed in relations of the region with the
centre as a result of the aluminium conflict, the banking crisis and the ever-worsening
situation in the VPK, as subsidies from extra-budgetary funds, soft-credits and state-orders
dried up.168 Thanks to the support of the aluminium and banking lobbies, the Oblast'
authorities had enough political weight to win over the support of the VPK enterprises.
Maximising the gains from this increasing regionalisation of the mighty VPK enterprises
demanded a strategy of opposition to the federal centre, since the enterprises' greatest
resource was their size, especially the size of their labour forces, (i.e. their lobbying "weight"
rather than their financial resources). Therefore the signing of a power-division treaty with the
federal centre – a privilege until then reserved for republics – became the overriding aim of
the regional administration. The terms of the treaty itself were perhaps not the only, or even
the main goal; it would be significant as a formal status-sign, which eased informal access to
federal resources informal.169 The treaty would be a certification of the lobbying-power
mobilised in the campaign for the treaty.
In January 1996, the first treaty between an Oblast' and the centre was signed, in which the
financial relations, the disposal of property and political competencies were defined.170 Of
especial importance was the agreement on the payment of tax to the centre, which in the
future was to be determined by means of ad-hoc negotiations. Tax transfers fell to 25% of
their previous amount, 70% of the taxes for the first three months of 1996 remained within the
region. The Oblast' was removed from the list of budget-donors. Secondly, a revision of the
division of federal and regional property was declared necessary, the regional rights of use
over federal property were to be expanded. Thirdly, the region acquired the right to a say in
the naming of federal officials in the region and the right to appoint plenipotentiary banks.
Privatisation171: A revision of the privatisation was started in January 1996. The bankrupting
of enterprises on grounds of tax debts to the regional budget was seen as a backdoor to
deprivatisation and restructuring. Furthermore, the price for enterprises was to be set by the
region and revised to take account of inflation. The region could hope for administrative
control over the privatisation process as well as a maximisation of revenue. These measures
followed the spirit of the Moscow privatisation programme.
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2.5.4 Krasnojarsk Krai
A) tyl
The Aluminium-Industry: The aluminium industry is the backbone of the region, yet is
crippled by the fact that control over the sector's core – the KrAZ Smelter – has been lost.
This occurred in the crisis conditions of the immediate post-Soviet era, as enterprises turned
to world markets to compensate for collapsing domestic demand. The easy profits thus gained
– since production was still heavily subsidised by cheap energy – went hand-in-hand with a
"criminalisation" of the industry as Mafia structures gained influence.
Western commercial structures partnered aluminium smelters in tolling arrangements to gain
a guaranteed supply of raw materials and demand for products, thus "disembedding" KrAZ
from the region.172 The aluminium industry as a whole with its huge energy needs has been at
loggerheads with the regional power generators, originally built to service it.173
The rest of the sector directly threatened by this development – especially KrAMZ, which
depends on KrAZ for supplies, have turned to the region, which has tried repeatedly to bring
KrAZ under its kryša, for instance through the imposition of a $100 million fine in 1995 for
non-payment of taxes.174 The Krai has also tried to strengthen the integration of the East
Siberian aluminium sector as a whole with a view to winning KrAZ back through
interregional co-operation in the Sibirskoe Soglashenie and the formation of interregional
FIGs. However the region has until now had little success.
The Nickel-Industry: The Noril'skij Nickel Works in the Taimyr Autonomous Okrug (AO) is
the largest single producer of nickel in the world and its taxes comprise 30% of the revenue of
the Krai. However the plant has stayed outside the kryša of the Krai.175 Instead, the
Kombinat has massively reduced its tax payments. Its political resources consist in the fact
that it has its own city (Noril'sk), has good contact in the centre, and is not in the Krai itself,
rather in the Taimyr AO, however directly subordinated to the Krai, and thus in a position to
play the Krai and the Okrug off against each other.
B) chozjajn
Conflict with Noril'ski Nickel: In September 1995, these competing claims sparked open
conflict between the Gubernator Zubov and the director of Norilskij Nickel Filatov, in which,
after mediation from Moscow, the Krai came off the worse, having to cede part of the
concern's taxes to the AO.
Conflict with ONEKSIMBank: Noril'skij Nickels independence from a regional kryša had,
however, unfortunate consequences. In December 1995, the state share-packet was entrusted
to ONEKSIMBank in exchange for a credit worth $ 170 million, one in a row of so-called
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"loans-for shares" auctions.176 The management opposed this move vehemently and refused
to co-operate with the bank's executives. The Krai sided with the bank, seeking to reach a
favourable deal over tax payments. However, the bank was in no need of regional allies, and
got its way with the resignation of Filatov – the Noril'slij Nickel director – in July 1996. The
Krai sought to reverse this misfortune through lobbying at the centre and administrative
harassment of the plant in the region but had no cards left to play.
2.5.5 Republic of Sacha (Jakutien)
A) tyl
Diamond industry177: Diamond extraction constitutes the dominant industry of the republic.
The Russian diamond industry is located virtually exclusively within the republic's
boundaries, in which there is little else. 80% of the republic's taxes flow from the diamond
extraction. Due to the geography of the republic the industry is massively dependent on the
maintenance of a huge and costly infrastructure. Thus, industry and the republic are more or
less two sides of the same coin.
The republic is important for the Russian economy: it accounts for 26% of the world
production of diamonds with an annual value of ca $ 1 billion.178
B) chozjajn
Relations with the centre: In July 1992, El'cin agreed to the formation of a single corporation
Almazy Rossija-Sacha (ARS) with full responsibility for all phases of extraction. Republic
and Federation received equal shares (32%); however, altogether 68% of the shares stayed in
the republic. Sacha received 20%-25% of the revenues from sale of diamonds to De Beers.179
Tax transfers have been regulated on an ad-hoc, one-channel basis which constitutes a huge
concession in the face of the arbitrariness of centre-region transfers. Federal revenues
collected in the republic were to fulfill all budgeted federal expenditure in the republic before
being transferred to the Centre.
The ownership relations and the tax agreements between republic and Federation had led in
1996 to a situation where the Federation hardly received any sums from the Republic. In
1995, 95.4% of ARS profits flowed to the republic. 26% of this sum ($300 million) were
federal taxes which stayed in the Republic.180
Conflict with the centre in 1996181: In 1996, a hidden conflict took place between federal
instances and Sacha/ARS. Many observers concluded that these were attempts on behalf of
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the centre to revise the financial relationship. The centre played its strongest card against the
region – sabotaging the negotiations of ARS with De Beers. Direct confrontation with the
region was carefully avoided. Negotiations between ARS and De Beers were indeed broken
off at the end of the year, without a renewal of the contract regulating the purchase of Russian
diamonds by De Beers, thus destabilising Sacha's financial position.182
2.5.6 Primor'e Krai183
A) kryša
In 1992, a joint-stock company PAKT was founded, in which the most important regional
enterprises participated. Around 9% of the working population of the Krai was employed by
PAKT members.184
Conflict over kryša: The politics of the liberal reforming Gubernator Vladimir Kuznecov
07-3103(3.$073$<-*<3-05$-&,70:$*D$073$eUcB$83(3.' 3-:"$?($U<-&2$IJJL@$1($1225$*D$eUcB_:$;A0
also a contact of El'cin – Evgenij Nazdratenko – replaced Kuznecov. He revealed his true
colours by naming leading members of PAKT to top posts in his administration.
Privatisation: Thus, the $83(3. '3-5 of PAKT had organised themselves a kryša. In August
1993 Nazdratenko put a stop to the formal privatisation in "essential spheres of the economy",
in which category he listed 64 regional and 108 federal enterprises.185 At auctions behind
closed doors PAKT acquired control over a large part of the regional economy for minimal
prices.
B) chozjajn
Organisation of the economy: Simultaneously, the regional administration became active as
chozjajn and extended administrative control over the regional economy. Friction emerged
between Nazdratenko and the original PAKT structures, especially as the Krai invited
ONEKSIMBank into the region to act as plenipotentiary.186 The connections of the regional
administration to the regional Mafia organisations also strengthened.187 Thus, the
administration became independent of PAKT just as PAKT was weakened by increasing
divergence between the interests of the VPK enterprises and of the fishing/shipping concerns.
Conflict with the centre: The administration instrumentalised the strength of its tyl by entering
into heated confrontations with the centre, and thereby "beating out" subsidies. The key issue
were energy prices: the administration fixed them low; at the end of the chain the miners were
left without pay and there were periodic power cuts. The federal subsidies acquired to pay the
striking miners seem to have been "absorbed" by the administration. This conflict peaked in
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1996, when the centre openly accused the regional administration of embezzling subsidies for
the miners and issued an ultimatum to restore order in the region.188
Conflict with the centre over border policy: Primor'e has also instrumentalised its tyl by
opposing and effectively ignoring federal policy on the Chinese border. Thereby the region
gains another "bargaining chip" relative to the centre to be traded in for subsidies etc.
Additionally, on a purely regional level of analysis, imports coming across the open border
were threatening regional retail monopolies in the region.
Conflict with the mayor: The conflict with the mayor of Vladivostock constitutes the most
bitter such conflict. The majority of the Krai population live in the capital, the region's
dependency on the city':$ <1583(0:$ &:$ 6*(:3fA3(025$ ,-310"$ B73$ 815*-$ ^3-3<P*+$ S1:$ 073
unexpected victor over the PAKT man Fadeev in 1993, since which time he has been subject
to a campaign of extreme physical intimidation and defamation.
?($ /3<038;3-$ IJJa@$ A(.3-$ 073$ 13,&:$ *D$ ^A;1):$ T$ .3<A05$ <-&83Y8&(&:03-$ T$ 073$ 815*-$ S1:
finally reinstated. This fact may be regarded as another attempt by central players (around
^A;1):>$&($UA0A8($IJJa$A(.3-$073$&(:0&,10&*($*D$073$?VH$0*$-*22$;16P$073$-3,&*(:k$073$:0-103,5
tailor-made for Primor'e was to undermine the tyl of the regional administration by
strengthening the city administration.189$ ^3-3<P*+:$ D&-:0$ :03<:$ 6*(:&:03.$ &($ *-,1(&:&(,$ 7&:
own tyl in an "economic council" and radically restructuring the city's financial arrangements,
unseating ONEKSIMBank:190
At the first organisational meeting [of the council] it became clear what the managers (chozjajstvenniki)
wanted and what the mayor needed. The local producers needed maximal benefits, tax-rebates and
83671(&:8:$*D$:3002&(,$<1583(0:$0*$2&fA&.103$8A0A12$(*(Y<1583(0:"$O&P0*-$^3-3<P*+$X""">$A-,3(025$(33.:
authoritative support, which he intends to obtain in return for creating a regime of benefits (l'got) for his
new-found friends. And such support is already promised.191
2.5.7 Samara Oblast'
A) tyl
AvtoVAZ: The chief source of tyl for the Samara authorities is the AvtoVAZ vehicle plant in
Tolyatti, which dominates the city of 0.7 mill inhabitants.192 In 1991 the plant and city sought
to extract themselves from under the direct control of the Oblast'. However, since then the
region and the plant have become almost as closely allied as the diamond industry and the
Republic of Sacha.193 AvtoVAZ accounts for three-quarters of the hard-currency revenue and
50% of the tax revenue of the Oblast'.194
B) kryša
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In the course of the privatisation the GKI attacked AvtoVAZ's obstructionist tactics, which
reduced the effectiveness of extra-regional auctions for VAZ shares. The old management
nevertheless stayed unchallenged.195
Characteristic of the business practices of the plant is the reploughing of any profits in
productive capacity despite enormous tax arrears, the standard justification for this being the
preparations for the next model, the desjatka. This behaviour is strongly reminiscent of Soviet
business practices, where a project, once started, became a vehicle for extracting ever more
funds from the centre.196
AvtoVAZ has a factual monopoly in Russia for the manufacture of cheap cars, which is also
protected by high import tariffs. Prices for its cars are in fact on a par with western prices.
VAZ had successfully blocked attempts by western firms to set up production lines in
Russia.197
AvtoVAZ has worked together with the other Volga region automobile producers; however,
since the enterprise's bank suffered losses in 1995 this co-operation has slackened. The
finances of the enterprise are opaque, it hardly co-operates with tax inspectors. Payment of the
workforce has been suspended on several occasions.198
Conflict with the centreR$ ?($1A0A8($IJJa@$U+0*OUd$S1:$ 01-,303.$;5$ 073$O^c$1:$1$65(&612
tax-defaulter. At first, it tried to escalate the conflict and thus politicise it. The Gubernator
B&0*+$(3,*0&103.$S&07$^3-(*85-.&(@$-3DA:3.$7*S3+3-$0*$<15$073$.381(.3.$1--31-:"199
The centre's tactic was to ignore the region's kryša and to punish those enterprises which
sought shelter behind the region. AvtoVAZ was thus threatened with bankruptcy and finally
agreed to a further emission of shares, thus jeopardising the position of the management,
consequently the relationship of the enterprise to the region.
C) chozjajn
Organisation of the Economy: The Oblast' has sought to anchor the car plant in the region. A
plan was worked out in 1995 for the "Stabilisation of the regional economy on the basis of the
automobile industry", which looked to the conversion of VPK enterprises and petrochemical
concerns to suppliers of VAZ.200 The forming of production chains within the region also
allows the region to support the spread of surrogate currencies, allowing tax evasion, and
further integrating the regional economy around the administration; such a chain was
introduced for instance in 1997 between the enterprises Samarenergo, Samaratransgaz,
Sintezkauchuk, Novkuibyshushkii and Sinetezspirt.201 The regional authorities have
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concentrated their attention on the technologically-advanced, hard-currency earning aviation
industry202, which is in fact party controlled by AvtoVAZBank.203
The administration also had recourse to the Moscow banks, especially after the 1995 bank
crisis weakened the regional finance sector. Inkombank and Rossiskij Kredit were among the
nine plenipotentiaries of the Oblast' appointed in 1996. The bank Menatep is of course
strongly represented through the oil company YUKOS. 204
Until the conflict over VAZ in 1996 relations between Samara and the centre have been good.
The strength of Samara is evident in the fact that there is an informal single-channel system
D*-$01C$0-1(:D3-:R$1:$0-A3$D*-$%& '(&)$%*+,*-*.$1(.$/1P71$073$;1-,1&(&(,$:0-3(,07$*D$1$;A.,30Y
donor allows it to retain a larger proportion of its revenue than a budget-recipient.205
However, the oil industry is integrated in the VIC Yukos and thus out of reach of the
administration.
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2.5.8  St. Petersburg
A) tyl
FinanceR$B73$U.8&(&:0-10&*($*D$V15*-$/*; =1P$0-&3.$0*$-325$*($073$:A<<*-0$*D$073$e303-:;A-,
banks and other groups interested in a commercial development of the city to gain the
authority needed to carry out a quick and effective privatisation leading to a development of
the city along the lines of finance and services, tourism and high-technology branches. This
policy, however, ensured the opposition of the massive Petersburg VPK (defence enterprises).
This sector is also organised in a formalised lobbying association.206 The development of the
financial sector stayed far behind Moscow – although protected against the Moscow banks –
and was damaged by the 1995 banking crisis.207
VPK: Petersburg is Russia's second biggest industrial centre and is dominated by the VPK,
which estimates place at 70-200 enterprises with 100.000-300.000 workers, 20-30% of the
Russian VPK.208
The Petersburg VPK has demonstrated – in contrast to Sverdlovsk – a high degree of
6*(63-03.$ 160&*($ &($ *<<*:&(,$ /*; =1P$ *+3-$ <-&+10&:10&*($ &::A3:$ *-$ 6-&0&6&:&(,$ 7&:$ (3,2360$ *D
lobbying at the centre on their behalf.209 The absence of the city-region conflict which
allowed the Sverdlovsk Gubernator Strachov to side with Moscow interests seems to have
permitted more effective organisation of the Petersburg VPK.
The change in administration as result of city elections in June 1996 was accompanied by a
shift in emphasis from finance to lobbying on behalf of the VPK. The administration was now
free to access the resources of the Moscow banks to balance the budget and help regional
3(03-<-&:3:R$/*; =1P's strategy was turned on its head.210
B) chozjajn
Privatisation: The Petersburg privatisation was praised as an example of the correct
implementation of federal legislation. The reasons for this are, firstly, that the privatisation
was a central part of the chozjajn politics and secondly, that Petersburg officials were highly
influential in the forming of the federal programme.211
The proceeds from privatisation became a major source of revenue for the administration,
accounting in 1995 for ca. 70% of income.212 To encourage privatisation and formal profit-
seeking profit tax was brought down to 21%, the lowest rate in Russia.213 Especially striking
was the readiness of the city authorities to privatise the land despite rising prices, thus
theoretically improving the chances of enterprises to attract investment capital.
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Privatisation of land: the mayor's office introduced changes to the federal privatisation in
order to reap a higher share of the rent from increasing land prices.214 In contrast to Moscow
the Merie sought to sell land to the enterprises at far higher prices than originally stipulated.
This met with initial opposition from the GKI (Federal State Property Committee). However,
in May 1995, a compromise was struck which enabled the privatisation of land to proceed.
This policy met with only limited success, since many enterprises were not interested in
taking up the offer, for fear of becoming too attractive for outside investors. Petersburg,
therefore, lost greatly as chozjajn in comparison with Moscow due to its privatisation policy.
Relationship with the centreR$ ?($IJJa@$/*; =1P$*<<*:3.$073$63(0-3$*+3-$ 073$0-1(:D3-$*D$ 21(.Y
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then refused to transfer 43 billion Roubles of land tax. Here, he probably also was
strengthening his hand for the negotiating of a power-sharing treaty with the Federation.215
2.5.9 Republic of Tatarstan
A) tyl
Tatneft ranks amongst Europe's largest oil-drilling companies.216 In Russia, the enterprise, as
the only strong regional TEK (energy sector) company, is the exception to the rule of the
vertically-integrated companies. 40% of the shares and the 'golden share' are owned by the
republic. The company was initially the chief resource of the republican leadership. KamAZ
was the largest truck and motor producer in the USSR and is located in its own city of
%1;3-3 '(53$^32(5"217 61% of the social product is accounted for by industry, only 17.4% by
agriculture.218 Apart from the oil and vehicle sectors the VPK has an important place in the
region.
B) chozjajn
Conflict with the centre: The first priority of the republic was to gain Moscow's recognition of
Tatar ownership of natural resources. This was accomplished with the signing of two treaties
in 1992 regulating economic relations. The tyl of the enterprise enabled the republic to acquire
control of the resources which the enterprise itself worked. In this way the republic secured
the independence of the enterprise and its control over it.219
The Tatar privatisation was carried out in such a way as to ensure that managements were not
displaced, that ownership stayed in the region and – a Tatar speciality – that as much control
as possible over enterprises remained with the republican government.220
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With sovereignty over the natural resources and the privatisation process under theri belt,
Tatar authorities could consolidate their control of the regional economy. The Tatar VPK,
initially sceptical of the soveranisation ??? of the republic since it feared the loss of subsidies
and contracts, was won over.221 The tightness of the republic's grip on the oil industry proved
itself, however, dependent on the federal system of export quotas (see below).222 Agriculture
has remained almost completely under supervision of the republican government, securing the
self-sufficiency of the republic. 25% of expenditure flowed to agriculture in 1996; resource
rent is simply redistributed. However, at the beginning of 1997, the republican orders for
wheat were cut back by 30%, a sign for the political effects of declining revenue from oil.223
In December 1995, the largest Russian joint-venture was launched between the Kamaz
subsidiary plant ElAZ and General Motors. (see below) The republic has sufficient own
resources to attract foreign investment by offering tax-breaks. By tempting investors with its
own concessions, the republic then puts pressure on the Federation to match these sums. Thus,
the republic and the Federation contributed respectively 120 billion Roubles to the ElAZ
project.224
Tatarstan and Tatneft: Tatneft faces considerable difficulties. Firstly, oil drilling in Tatarstan
is expensive. Reserves are reaching exhaustion and the oil is sulphurous. Furthermore,
Tatarstan has no capacity for the refining of oil: in Soviet times the oil was refined in the
Ukraine. Tatar oil is exported mixed with Tjumen oil, without which it loses value.225
Secondly, Tatarstan is of course reliant on the Russian pipe network for exports.
The republican oil-industry is therefore heavily dependent on the Russian context. The
relations between the republic and the oil industry have changed in accordance with changes
in the Russian export regime. With the export system the republic harvested most of the
resource rent, the enterprise was reliant on the political leadership for hard currency. In 1995,
the export quota system was completely abolished at IMF insistence. Henceforth, it was in the
interest of Tatneft to maximise own exports so as to maintain hard currency revenues. The
management consequently refused to pay taxes in kind any more. These developments lead to
a sharp decline in republican revenues.226
The cooling of the relationship between the republic and Tatneft caused the republic to
reorganise the industry, probably trying to tighten its control. Besides, the administration
showed itself readier to concede a role to the transrussian vertically-integrated oil companies
(VIKs) within the region. In 1996 Lukoil was permitted to supply the republic with petrol and
other oil products, since Tatar FIGs around Tatneft had not been able to reliably supply the
needs of agriculture and industry. Although Tatneft opposed this concession vigorously, it
could only achieve the exclusion of Lukoil from any drilling. 227
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Tatarstan and KamAZ: The relationship between Tatarstan and KamAZ has moved in the
opposite direction. Initially, KamAZ constituted something of a 'republic within a republic',
lobbying for itself and together with the other automobile factories in the Federal centre.228
However, as subsidies, orders and credits became increasingly difficult to 'beat out of the
centre' in this fashion, the resources which the republic could offer became increasingly
attractive. The plant offered to distribute orders as far as possible within the region, and
especially to increase payments into the budget if the republic could help with liquidity
problems.
This new spirit of co-operation bore fruit during the negotiations for the ElAZ General Motors
joint-venture, in which it was agreed that in the course of time KaMAZ should become the
main supplier of the new plant. The republic supported KaMAZ's plans to rid itself of many
loss-making satellite firms. Due to the plausibility of KaMAZ modernisation plans and the
stabilisation of 1995, KaMAZ received a $100 million credit from the EBRD in February
1996. The federal government agreed upon a row of support measures including the
restructuring of KaMAZ's debts to the federal budget. However, the status of "consolidated
tax-payer" – marking full redemption in the eyes of the federal authorities – was not
awarded.229
Tatarstan and the VPK: In the summer of 1995, Tatarstan acted as kryša for the VPK in two
conflicts. The debts of the Tatar VPK to Gazprom were written off in exchange for the
transfer to Gazprom of the Tattranzgaz (gas transport) enterprise. Later in the same year,
possibly as a consequence of this demarche, Tatarstan ceased payment of taxes to the
Federation until the centre had paid billions of Roubles of outstanding orders. 15 of the largest
Tatar VPK enterprises were granted large tax breaks by presidential ukaz in February 1996 to
match benefits offered by the republic itself.230
The core of the Tatar bank sector – the Ak Bars Bank – is directly linked to the political
leadership. It distributes credits to industry and agriculture, issues promissory notes, and
manages all extra-budgetary funds.231
Conflict with the centre232: Ironically, the nearing of KamAZ to Tatarstan was sealed by the
attack of the centre in late 1996. Tatneft and KamAZ found themselves on the list of the
largest tax-defaulters. In 1996, KamAZ had paid nothing into the federal budget. While
Tatneft paid up peacefully, KamAZ turned to the republican leadership for protection, and
found itself being put on the black list of enterprises to be bankrupted. Only after difficult
negotiations could President Šajmiev buy the enterprise free for 9 billion Roubles out of the
republican treasury.
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2.5.10  Summary
As I stated earlier, it seems to be the case that the richest regions are also the most
"regionalised". It by no means follows automatically that a resource-rich region is powerful.
The example of Tjumen' is crucial in this regard: it is fatally weakened by the curious
coincidence that its immense reserves of natural gas are located in the one autonomous okrug,
its oil in the other, which are respectively subservient to Gazprom and the relevant VIKs.
Tjumen is in a way the negative-image of Sakha. Primor'e – a relatively disadvantaged region
– is politically strong, whereas Kraznojarsk, with rich natural resources, has not fulfilled its
promise. However, the more industrialised a region, the more regionalised, since industrial
enterprises have freed themselves from ministerial structures to a greater extent than
agricultural and are now grounded in the region. Where industrial/resource-rich regions are in
disarray, it is due to the interference of world-markets, which weaken crucial enterprises, or to
conflict between kryšas, i.e. between cities or autonomous okrugs and the regional authorities.
The politics, which regions pursue with relation to the centre are thus influenced by their
objective features channeled through the strategies of the economic actors. Primor'e, whose
main resource was its organisation, has mobilised this resource by grim opposition,
Sverdlovsk, with a large potential weight, mobilised this through steady oppositional pressure
on the centre, Sakha's enormous value to the Federation is filtered through its "monoculture"
to win huge rents from the Federation with minimal conflict. The capital city opted out of the
national privatisation programme, and thus immensely strengthened the city authorities' hand
relative to its constituents Russia. In Kraznojarsk, economic instability has at once been cause
and result of the weakness of the regional authorities. Shifting coalitions in the region are
often caused by changes in the international context: pressure from the IMF to abolish export
quotas or stabilise the currency or changing world market conditions – and these again effect
Federation-Subject relations. Pressure from the IMF can narrow the win-set of the Federation
in dealings with the regions far enough as to cause crackdowns on tax-debtors such as in
UA0A8($IJJa$T$81(&D3:03.$;5$073$&(:012210&*($*D$073$O^c"
In a situation of "ripe regionality" the regional administration – the chozjajzn – gains an
encompassing interest in his region, which implies a lengthening of its time-horizons. A
preference for encouraging domestic and attracting foreign investment plays an increasing
role, while the capacity for implementing policies to these ends by creating favourable
conditions and providing credible guarantees is given, due to the dominant position of the
chozjajn in the region. In this way the regional administration can – to a certain extent –
compensate for the inability of the centre to secure stability. Such "regionality" implies
however the ability to extract rents from the centre, thereby destabilising the macro-economy.
In as much as the relevant regions – more or less the ones surveyed here – are strongly
networked with each other, a possible development might be their acquiring an encompassing
interest with reference to the whole Federation, thus helping to reintegrate Russia around a
regional core.
3 Conclusion: The Poetics of Theory
That two schools of neo-institutionalist theory offer diametrically contrasting theories of
change might afford the analyst the chance to enliven his empirical work by finding in a
theoretical conclusion for one house and against the other. Here however I choose to give
both the benefit of the doubt. What justification can there be for offering two tales of change?
A reason for doing this – the most straightforward – can be found in an awareness of the
tropological basis of social theory. Hayden White's classic analysis of historical narrative –
Metahistory – is particularly useful in this respect.233 White has shown how historical vision
is open to poetical analysis, employing for this purpose the classic tropes of metaphor,
metonymy and synecdoche. Metaphor is the naming of a whole by another whole (literally a
transferral), i.e. "my love is a rose"; metonymy the naming of a whole by one of its parts, as in
the use of "fifty sails" for "fifty ships"; synecdoche the naming of a whole through one of its
parts, in that the part takes on the presence of a whole, is therefore embued with wholeness, as
in the expression "he is all heart". According to White these tropes generate respectively a
language of identity (metaphor), a language of extrinsicality (metonymy), and a language of
intrinsicality (synecdoche).
My argument is that the influence of the latter two figures of speech-metonymy and
synecdoche-in narrative, as described by White, clearly fits the sort of arguments with which
the two schools of neo-institutionalism respectively work.
By metonymy, then, one can simultaneously distinguish between two phenomena and reduce one to the
status of a manifestation of the other. And by such reductions (...) the phenomenal world can be populated
with a host of agents and agencies that are presumed to exist behind it.234
Here, we can recognise the historical-institutionalist insistence that not only preferences, but
the very existence and identity of actors is shaped by institutions. Alternatively, we see in
synecdochally-inspired narration elements, which equate with the "invisible hand" and
collective action dilemmas in exploring the relationship between micro and macro.
At the heart of the Organicist strategy [the mode of argumentation associated with the figure of
synecdoche] is a metaphysical commitment to the paradigm of the microcosmic-macrocosmic
relationship; and the Organicist historian will tend to be governed by the desire to see the individual
entities as components of processes which aggregate into wholes that are greater than, or qualitatively
different from, the sum of their parts.235
One might tentatively suggest instead of regarding action and structure as "existing" in any
way they can be more usefully understood as figures of speech in narrative strategies, as
synecdoche (action/intrinsicality) and metonymy (structure/extrinsicality). Metaphor – the
language of identity – would in such an analysis cover the whole area of social theory
associated with functionalism, involving concepts of equillibrium and harmony of sub-
systems.
White's description of the "emplotment" which these tropes tend to generate also matches the
contrasting theories of change to which I have already referred. White argues that synecdoche
engenders comedy, whereas metonymy governs tragedy. Comic change consists of the actions
of actors under circumstances of disharmony leading often unintentionally but unavoidably to
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an eventual resolution. Change is effected by action and impelled towards the future. Tragedy,
however, depicts acts as futile confronted with the arrangement of fate. Change occurs as
agon culminates in crisis – literally a turning-point -, leading then to resolution. Comic change
is strongly orientated to a point in the future at which resolution will be reached. Tragedy
looks back on a past of imperfection and repeated failure, successive agons punctuated by
crises.
The reconciliations which occur at the end of comedy are reconciliations of men with men, of men with
their world and their society, the condition of society is represented as being purer, saner, and healthier.
The reconciliations that occur at the end of tragedy are much more sombre; they are more in the nature of
resignations of men to the conditions under which they must labour in the world. These conditions are
asserted to be inalterable and eternal and the implication is that man cannot change them but must work
within them. 236
The identification of the historical-institutionalist theory of change – "punctuated
equilibrium" as tragic and the "incremental evolution" of Douglas North as comic is thus in no
way "allegorical": "Punctuated equilibrium" is tragic, "incremental evolution" is comic, in the
classic sense of these genres. White relates metaphor – the trope I have not explored in this
paper – to romance, a tale of ripening and growth, terms which are associated with
functionalism, systems-theory, modernisation theory. Thus, White's central argument holds
true also for social theory, as he indeed expected it to do: "historical inspiration", or
theoretical methodology is lingustic in nature and generates the tale which is then told, i.e. the
empirical contents of the analysis. The "theories of change" which Krasner and North have
developed through empirical work, were there from the very beginning in the logic of their
starting position.
Hayden White's predecessor in this field, Northrop Frye, expressed the configurations
outlined above in a slightly different manner.237 He analyses the four stories which can be
told. Comedy he defines as a tale of those like ourselves. In social theory this equates to an
actor-orientated approach. Tragedy is the tale of those of an order of magnitude greater than
ourselves, which in social theory translates as structure/institution. Comedy is the tale of
spring, Tragedy the tale of autumn. Romance is the tale of summer, of the unique victory of
the protagonist over his world. This dovetails especially neatly with modernisation theory.
Satire is the tale of winter, the trope of catharsis, according to White, based on ironic
awareness of the tropological nature of language. This is the trope inspiring this paper.
Inherent to the genres of both comedy and tragedy, writes Northrop Frye, is the tendency to
project from within the narrative, as if extrapolating from the contents, a world-view, a
philosophy, a theory of change.
Where does this leave the theoretical and empirical aspects of this paper? One might see here
a confirmation of theory in the social sciences, on the one hand through its sound linguistic
foundations, on the other by the way in which it – making a virtue out of a necessity –
highlights these very preconditions of explanation through the alienating effect of theoretical
language. Perhaps the energy of the tropes – the attractions and repulsions between them – is
thus in my view best harvested by its harnessing at a meta-theoretical level through
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dialogue.238 As Lotman argues, the gain from dialogue lies in the quality of information
gleaned, rather than the quantity achieved through monologue, even if all that can be gleaned
is an awareness of the partialness of any single account. 239
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